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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is appropriate pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann- § 35-1-82.53(2) (1988); Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 
(1988); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (1988); and Utah R. App. P. 14. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
There are no disputed issues of fact; for purposes of 
this appeal, petitioner accepts the Administrative Law Judge's 
(ALJ) findings of fact. In dispute is the application of law to 
the facts found by the ALJ and Industrial Commission. Based upon 
the undisputed findings of fact, the issues are: 
a. Whether there is medical causation between the 
applicant's industrial injuries and her permanent and total 
disability. 
Standard of review:As to the application of facts to law or 
interpretation of law, correction of error standard of review 
without deference to the decision of the administrative agency, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) ; Willardson v. 
Industrial Commission, 216 U.A.R. 12 (Utah App. June 28, 1993). 
King v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 
993); Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 
1 
1992); Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 
581 (Utah 1991) . 
b. Whether applicant qualifies under the "odd lot doctrine" 
for permanent and total disability. 
Standard of review: As to the application of facts to law or 
interpretation of law, correction of error standard of review 
without deference to the decision of the administrative agency, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) ; King v. Industrial 
Com'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993); Luckau v. 
Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 1992); Morton 
International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988). 
Attached hereto in appendix A of the Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This is a petition for review of an Industrial Commission 
of Utah Order denying petitioner's motion for review of the 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) denial of permanent, total 
disability benefits. 
B. Course of proceedings below. 
Applicant/petitioner Claudia Cox filed an application for 
hearing seeking unpaid medical expenses, temporary total disability 
compensation, permanent partial impairment compensation, permanent 
total disability and interest on February 13, 1992, for an accident 
which she suffered in the course of employment on August 15, 1988. 
(R. 1). A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah on August 5, 1992. The 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order denying benefits was issued on February 4, 1993. (R. 64-87; 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, attached hereto in 
Appendix B of the Addendum). 
Cox filed her Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission 
on March 5, 1993. (R. 88). The Industrial Commission issued its 
Order Denying Motion for Review on April 28, 1993. (R. 116-124; 
Order Denying Motion for Review, attached hereto in Appendix C of 
the Addendum). Thereafter, Cox filed her Petition for Writ of 
3 
Review (R. 125) with this Court on May 27, 1993, which Writ of 
Review (R. 130) was issued June 10, 1993. 
C. Disposition below. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits, 
finding that the relatively small portion of the petitioner's 
overall disability which was caused by her industrial injury was 
insufficient to support medical causation between Cox's permanent 
total disability and the industrial accident. The Industrial 
Commission thereafter denied Cox's Motion for Review of the Order 
denying benefits, from which denial this petition for review is 
taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal, applicant/petitioner accepts 
the findings of fact of the ALJ and the Industrial Commission. 
Below are the relevant facts of this appeal, as found by the ALJ 
and Industrial Commission. 
1. Claudia Cox, born March 10, 1940, began working for 
Utah Power and Light in a clerical/accounting position in 1977. 
(R. at 66; Appendix B at 3.) 
2. Ms. Cox had various back problems for which she 
sought intermittent treatment from 1963 until 1986. (R. 66-7; 
Appendix B at 3-4.) 
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3. On October 4, 1986 Ms. Cox was injured while riding 
in the back of a pick-up truck in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Ms. Cox 
suffered an acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary to 
centrally herniated L4-5 disc, a mild buldge of the L3-4 and a 
cervical radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the nerve 
roots C4-5 and C5-6 bilaterally. As a result of these injuries, 
Ms. Cox underwent surgery on January 5, 1987 whereby a semi-hemi 
laminotomy, foraminotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 were 
performed. (R. 68; Appendix B at 5.) 
4. On August 5, 1987 Ms. Cox was released by her 
physician to return to work. (R. 69; Appendix B at 6.) 
5. In December 1987, Ms. Cox suffered the first of two 
industrial accidents. As Ms. Cox went to sit on her chair, the 
chair rolled back and away from her. Ms. Cox fell to the floor on 
her buttocks, which resulted in back pain and muscle spasms. (Id.) 
6. On August 15, 1988, Ms. Cox suffered a second, and 
more significant, industrial accident. Ms. Cox was filling in for 
other workers who were on vacation. She attempted to open the 
bottom drawer of one of her co-worker's file drawers. Unbeknownst 
to Ms. Cox, the drawer was filled with heavy books and papers. 
When she tried to open the drawer, it stuck, jarring Ms. Cox's neck 
and back. Ms. Cox suffered severe and lasting pain in her back, 
neck and arms. Ms. Cox continued to work despite being in pain, 
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which she tried to manage with pain medications and muscle 
relaxers. (R. 70; Appendix B at 7. ) Ms, Cox filed an accident 
report (R. 16), and her description of the accident is corroborated 
by her co-employees and supervisor. (R. 17-18; attached hereto as 
Appendix G of the Addendum.) 
7. Finally on July 9, 1990 Ms. Cox was unable to 
continue working because of her pain. (R. 73; Appendix B at 10.) 
8. Ms. Cox filed an application for hearing seeking 
unpaid medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation, 
permanent partial impairment compensation, permanent total 
disability and interest on February 13, 1992, for the August 15, 
1988 industrial accident. (R. 1). 
9. On November 3, 1992, Ms. Cox was referred to a 
medical panel for evaluation, which issued its report on November 
27, 1992. The ALJ adopted the medical panel report to resolve all 
issues of causation and impairment. (R. 80; Appendix B at 17). 
10. The medical panel found Ms. Cox to be suffering from 
a 36% whole person permanent impairment. (R. 78; Appendix B at 
15) . 
11. Of Ms. Cox's 36% whole person impairment, 2.83% is 
attributable to the industrial injury she suffered on August 15, 
1988. Id. 
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12. Of Ms. Cox's 36% whole person impairment, 1.27% is 
attributed to the industrial injury she suffered in December, 1987. 
Id. 
13. The remaining percentage of Ms. Cox's whole person 
impairment stems from her preexisting condition. Id. 
14. Nothing has contributed to Ms. Cox's whole person 
impairment rating since the industrial accident on August 15, 1988. 
Id. 
15. The medical panel found that "there is a causal 
connection between the applicant's symptoms" and the industrial 
accidents. Id. 
16. The ALJ found that Ms. Cox's testimony that her 
condition worsened after her August 15, 1988 injury is supported by 
the medical records. (R. 82; Appendix B at 19). 
17. On December 21, 1992, Ms. Cox was declared by Social 
Security to be disabled. (R. 51-57, 65; Social Security Decision 
attached hereto Appendix F at 1-6, Appendix B at 2) . 
18. The Social Security Disability decision lists ten 
(10) separate medical problems that contribute to Ms. Cox's 
disability. Of those 10 problems, there is a possibility that six 
(6) are caused by the industrial accidents. (R. 54-55, 83; 
Appendix F at 2-3, Appendix B at 20). 
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19. Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, upon evaluating Ms. Cox, 
determined on March 30, 1992 that there was no way that Ms. Cox 
could return to work and that she should receive a speedy 
disability retirement. (R. 76; Appendix B at 13). 
20. A functional capacity evaluation of Ms. Cox at 
Carbon Emery Physical Therapy/Alta Health Services determined that 
she could only participate in light/sedentary work. Id. 
21. The ALJ found that Ms. Cox is "probably totally 
disabled." (R. 85; Appendix B at 22). 
22. Legal causation is not disputed. (R. 81; Appendix 
B at 18). 
23. The ALJ denied Ms. Cox's application for permanent 
total disability benefits, finding that the industrial accidents 
minimally contributed to the applicant's overall disability. (R. 
82-5; Appendix B at 19-22), and that Ms. Cox had other medical 
problems which "could have affected the applicant's ability and 
motivation to continue working." (R. 82; Appendix B at 19). 
24. The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the ALJ's 
finding, stating that "The relatively small proportion of the 
applicant's impairment that was attributed to the industrial 
accident of August 15, 1988, is, in our view, insufficient to 
support a finding that the applicant's permanent total disability 
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was caused by that industrial accident." (R. 122; Appendix C at 
7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Worker's Compensation Act is legislation with 
the humane purpose of protecting and providing compensation to 
injured employees. The Act should be liberally construed to effect 
this purpose. The Administrative Law Judge erred when she failed 
to consider this claim liberally and award benefits. Construing 
Ms. Cox's claim liberally, she adequately met her burden of 
demonstrating that her injuries and disability were medically 
caused, at least in part, by her industrial injuries. 
2. Even if Ms. Cox's ability to work is affected by 
"non-industrial" factors, she qualifies for permanent total 
disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue No. 1 
The ALJ and the Industrial Commission applied the wrong 
standard of causation to Applicant's disability. 
In considering Ms. Cox's claims, it must be remembered 
that the Worker's Compensation Act should be given a liberal 
construction in order to fulfil its purpose of protecting employees 
and providing financial security. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). This court has 
recently reaffirmed this construction, holding that, M[i]n order to 
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fulfill the purpose of worker's compensation, 'the Act should be 
liberally construed and applied to provide coverage' and any doubts 
should be resolved in favor of the applicant." Luckau v. Board of 
Review, 840 P.2d 811, 815 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State Tax 
Comm'n, 685 P.2d at 1053). See also McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 
567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977) . 
In this case, the ALJ and the Industrial Commission did 
not give the applicant the benefit of the doubt in any regards and 
thus have defeated the purpose of this act, leaving Ms. Cox without 
remedy. There is substantial evidence that Ms. Cox's disability 
was caused, in part, by her industrial accidents. Yet the issue of 
causation gets muddied by Ms. Cox's pre-existing back conditions, 
along with her evident emotional and socio-economic symptoms 
resulting from her disability. The ALJ and Commission got 
sidetracked by these collateral issues. Instead of giving Ms. Cox 
the benefit of the doubt, the ALJ speculated on other factors which 
might have caused her permanent total disability. 
Giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt in these 
circumstances, an award of benefits is appropriate. Our Supreme 
court has held that "[pjolicy considerations in worker's 
compensation cases dictate that statutes be liberally construed in 
favor of an award." Tisco Intermountain v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 744 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Utah 1987). While "policy 
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considerations have no application in the absence of any evidence 
to support an award...," id. (emphasis added), this is not such a 
case. As can be seen in the statement of facts and the following 
sections, there is substantial evidence that applicant's disability 
was caused in part by her industrial accidents. As such, the 
benefit of the doubt should have been given to the applicant. The 
ALJ and Industrial Commission erred in failing to do so by applying 
an incorrect burden of proving medical causation. 
Ms. Cox's application for permanent and total disability 
was denied because of the application of erroneous standards of 
medical causation.1 Ms. Cox has never asserted that her pre-
existing and subsequent medical problems are not partially 
responsible for her disability and inability to work. However, her 
industrial accidents have contributed to her permanent and total 
disability, and thus are compensable. 
The ALJ construed the issue in this case as "whether the 
August 15, 1988 compensable industrial injury is the cause of the 
applicant's current permanent total disability." (R. 81; Appendix 
1
 The court in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986) set forth two causation requirements for a person with a pre-
existing condition. The first is legal causation, which dictates 
that one must show that "[t]he employment contributed something 
substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday 
life..." Id at 25. Clearly, the ALJ found legal causation, but 
denied benefits based upon medical causation. (R. 70, 81; Appendix 
B at 7, 18). Legal causation was not disputed. See Appendix G. 
(R. 16-8). Therefore legal causation need not be addressed. 
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B at 18)(emphasis added). The ALJ's application of a causation 
standard of exclusive causation does not conform to the standard 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Other comments by the ALJ indicate that 
she also applied a significant contribution standard, again in 
violation of the Allen standard. 
The Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's application of 
this erroneous standard, itself applying a sicrnificant contribution 
standard, stating that the "relatively small proportion of the 
applicant's impairment that was attributed to the industrial 
accident ... is, in our view, insufficient to support a finding 
that the applicant's permanent total disability was caused by that 
industrial accident." (R. 122; Appendix C at 7) . Neither the 
exclusive causation, nor the significant contribution standards 
applied by the ALJ and Industrial Commission are found in Utah 
workers' compensation law. 
Where, as in this case, there is some medical causation 
between the industrial accident and the disability, it is error to 
deny benefits on the basis of finding other, concurrent, more 
significant causations. "Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining 
compensation. Our cases make clear that 'the aggravation or 
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lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is 
compensable." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. 
To show medical causation, a claimant must "prove the 
disability is medically the result of an exertion or injury that 
occurred during a work-related activity." Id. at 27. A claimant 
does not have to prove that her disability was wholly caused by the 
injury, but only has to show by a preponderance of the evidence "a 
medically demonstrable causal link between the work-related 
exertions and the unexpected injuries that resulted from those 
strains." Id.(emphasis added). The Allen court further reiterated 
that exclusive causation is not the proper medical causation 
standard. "We are mindful that the key question in determining 
causation is whether, given this body and this exertion, the 
exertion in fact contributed to this injury." Id. at 24 (emphasis 
and italics added). 
This court most recently reiterated this medical 
causation standard in Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 
U.A.R. 12 (Utah App. June 28, 1993). In that case the petitioner 
argued that because the ALJ prefaced his finding of no causation 
with the word "significant contribution," that the ALJ applied an 
erroneous causation standard. This court held: 
Petitioner correctly asserts that there is no 
requirement in the applicable statute that the 
work-related activities "significantly" 
contribute to an injury in order for a 
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compensable industrial accident to occur. The 
only requirement is that there be a medical 
and legal causal relationship between 
petitioner's condition and work-related 
activities, significant or otherwise. 
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).2 
The petitioner's claim for disability in Willardson was 
ultimately rejected because this court found that the word 
"significantly" was unintended surplusage, and that the ALJ and 
Commission did not in fact use a "significant contribution" 
standard in finding medical causation. Id. However looking at 
the ALJ and Commission's findings in the present case demonstrates 
that a "significant contribution" standard was indeed applied. 
Such an application violates the "medically demonstrable causal 
link" standard set forth in Allen and reaffirmed in Willardson. 
As outlined above, the ALJ relied upon the medical 
panel's findings, which have not been challenged. The medical 
panel assigned Ms. Cox a 36% whole person impairment rating. Of 
that 36% whole person impairment, 2.83% is a result of the 
industrial injury suffered on August 15, 1988 and 1.27% is a result 
2
 For further support of a non-exclusive or non-proportional 
causation requirement, see Virgin v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 
803 P.2d 1284, 1288 n. 4 (Utah App. 1990), where this court noted 
that Utah courts deny benefits only when "the disability was solely 
the result of a pre-existing condition" and where "the disability 
was due entirely to a pre-existing condition." Id. (Citing 
Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987); Olsen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 776 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 1989) aff'd, 797 
P.2d 1098 (Utah 1990). 
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of the industrial injury she suffered in December, 1987. Nothing 
has contributed to Ms. Cox's whole person impairment rating since 
the industrial accident on August 15, 1988. The medical panel 
found that "there is a causal connection between the applicant's 
symptoms" and the industrial accidents. The ALJ found that Ms. 
Cox's testimony that her condition worsened after her August 15, 
1988 injury is supported by the medical records. The ALJ found 
that Ms. Cox is "probably totally disabled." Yet despite these 
findings, benefits were denied because "there is alot [sic] of 
evidence that leads one to the conclusion that the August 15, 1988 
injury only minimally contributed to the applicant's overall 
disability." (R. at 82; Appendix B at 19). Clearly, the ALJ 
applied the more onerous and incorrect "significant contribution" 
standard.3 
Likewise the Industrial Commission erroneously 
apportioned causation in its denial of benefits: 
The relatively small proportion of the 
applicant's impairment that was attributed to 
3
 The defendant, in arguing to the Industrial Commission for 
the application of as much as an exclusive or significant 
contribution standard, admitted that Ms. Cox met the "medically 
demonstrable link" causation standard. It argued to the Industrial 
Commission that "The most that can be found are medical opinions 
that said accident contributed to Applicant's overall disability." 
(R. at 106; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Applicant's Motion for Review at p. 5, attached herein in appendix 
E of the Addendum). If the accident contributed to Ms. Cox's 
disability, then benefits are appropriate. 
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the industrial accident of August 15, 1988, 
is, in our view, insufficient to support a 
finding that the applicant's permanent total 
disability was caused by that industrial 
accident. 
(R. 122; Appendix C at 7). 
Indeed, as noted above, the ALJ may have applied a sole 
causation standard, clearly an incorrect burden, as seen in her 
findings that: 
Although some of the applicant's medical care 
providers have pointed to the applicant's back 
and neck problems and her loss of her job as 
causes of her current disability, none have 
indicated clearly that the industrial injuries 
are the sole cause of her back and neck 
problems and the loss of her job. 
(R. 80; Appendix B at 17) (emphasis added). 
The August 15, 1988 industrial accident is the "straw 
that broke the camel's back." Though the percentage of Ms. Cox's 
whole person impairment attributable to the accident is less than 
that attributed to her prior non-industrial accidents, it is the 
August 15th accident that made her body dysfunctional for 
employment purposes, and rendered the applicant totally disabled. 
The ALJ relied upon the fact that Ms. Cox continued to 
work after her August 15, 1988 accident to show that her industrial 
accidents did not result in her permanent disability. (R. 91, 
attached hereto in Appendix D of the Addendum; R. 82-84; Appendix 
B at 19-21). Such a finding is in error, as permanent total 
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disability benefits may be awarded even though a claimant has 
returned to work following the industrial injury. Peck v. Eimco 
Process Equipment Co., 748 P.2d 572, 574 (Utah 1987). This 
principle was articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Norton v. 
Industrial Com'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Utah 1986): 
With respect to the administrative law 
judge's finding that Norton's continued work 
for six years was proof that he was not 
totally disabled in 1983f it should be pointed 
out that that fact standing alone does not 
foreclose Norton's claim. The administrative 
law judge correctly considered Norton's return 
to work as one factor to be weighed in 
determining his disability. He erred when he 
failed to consider the condition under which 
Norton continued his employment, as manifested 
by his finding "the very fact that the 
applicant continued to work in underground 
mining for six years following his accident is 
convincing evidence that his accident did not 
render him permanently and totally disabled." 
Norton's decision to return to work did not 
automatically disqualify him from receiving 
permanent total disability benefits, where the 
facts indicate that throughout the remainder 
of his employ he was not restored to health. 
The evidence is undisputed that Norton spent 
the last six of his working years in 
considerable pain. 
Id. 
Likewise, the ALJ in the present case found that Ms. 
Cox's condition worsened after her August 15, 1988 accident. (R. 
82; Appendix B at 19) . She continued to work in pain by relying on 
pain medications and curtailing virtually all other activities. 
The medical panel found that "there is a causal connection between 
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the applicant's symptoms'1 and the industrial accidents. Id. Based 
upon such findings of fact, it was error for the ALJ and the 
Commission to find that there was no medical causation between Ms. 
Cox's industrial injuries and her permanent and total disability. 
Issue No. 2 
The applicant is entitled to permanent and total disability 
under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
Likewise the ALJ and Industrial Commission failed to 
liberally construe the Worker's Compensation Act in rejecting Ms. 
Cox's claim that she was entitled to benefits under the "odd-lot" 
doctrine. Permanent total disability benefits should be granted 
"[w]hen a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an 
industrial accident is combined with other factors to render the 
claimant unable to obtain employment." Zimmerman v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah, 785 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis 
added). These factors include a claimant's "age, education, 
training and mental capacity." Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 
P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1984). "It is the unique configuration of 
these factors that together will determine the impact of the 
impairment on the individual's earning capacity." Id. 
There is no question that Ms. Cox is totally disabled and 
unemployable. Ms. Cox has been declared by Social Security to be 
disabled. (R. 54-55, 83; Appendix F at 2-3, Appendix B at 2) . Two 
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independent functional capacity evaluations determined that Ms. Cox 
cannot return to work. (R. 76; Appendix B at 13.) The ALJ found 
that Ms. Cox is "probably totally disabled." (R. 85; Appendix B at 
22) . 
The ALJ and Commission premised their denial of 
disability benefits upon other non-industrial factors which may 
have contributed to Ms. Cox's inability to work. Such factors 
include depression, fatigue, hypothyroidism, fibromyalgia, 
polyarthritis, polypharmacy, degenerative joint disease and 
degenerative disc disease. (R. 77, 82, 84-5, 122; Appendix B at 
14, 19, 21-22; Appendix C at 7) . Further, the defendant asserted 
in arguing against the motion for review that Ms. Cox's limited 
high school education and her "lack of transferable skills, prior 
back surgeries, and other medical problems not related to her 
industrial injury," contributed to her total disability. (R. 105-
06; appendix E at 4-5). 
Without doubt these non-industrial factors have 
contributed to Ms. Cox's total disability. Further there is no 
question that Ms. Cox is 36% whole person impaired, (R. 78; 
Appendix B at 15) and that the last two incidents contributing to 
this impairment rating were the industrial injuries she suffered on 
December, 1987, and on August 15, 1988. Id. 
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Given these facts, Ms. Cox is entitled to permanent total 
disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine. "Under the odd-lot 
doctrine, ... total disability may be found in the case of workers 
who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so 
handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well-
known branch of the labor market." Peck, 748 P.2d at 575 {quoting 
Marshall, 681 P. 2d at 212; 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation § 57.51, at 10-164.24 (1983)). To qualify for 
benefits under the odd lot doctrine, an employee first must show 
that "'he or she can no longer perform the duties required in his 
or her occupation.'" Zupon v. Industrial Commission, 221 UAR 37, 
37-8 (Utah App. Sept. 14, 1993) (quoting Zimmerman, 785 P.2d at 
1131). Second, the employee must show that she cannot be 
rehabilitated. Zupon, 221 UAR at 38; Zimmerman, 785 P.2d at 1131. 
The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the 
employee can perform steady work. Id. 
Ms. Cox qualifies for permanent and total disability 
under the odd-lot doctrine. She has a permanent impairment which 
has been medically caused, at least in part, by an industrial 
accident. She is fifty-three years old, has minimal schooling, no 
transferable skills and severe non-industrial related medical 
problems as well. These factors conspire to prevent her from 
returning to the work force or from being retrained in a capacity 
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that could accommodate her impairment* Because her industrial 
injuries have medically contributed to her disability, she is 
entitled to permanent total disability benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying improperly rigid and inaccurate standards, the 
Commission failed to liberally apply the Worker's Compensation Act 
to give the benefit of the doubt to the applicant. This is in 
direct contravention of the policies and ideals long ago embraced 
by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. 
The facts as found by the ALJ and affirmed by the 
Industrial Commission establish that Claudia Cox did meet her 
burden of demonstrating that her injuries and disability were 
medically caused by her industrial injuries. Applying the correct 
causation standard of "a medically demonstrable causal link," Ms. 
Cox's industrial injuries caused her disability. The Industrial 
Commission erred in denying benefits. 
Even if Ms. Cox's ability to work is affected by "non-
industrial" factors, she nevertheless qualifies for permanent total 
disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine." The industrially related 
impairment, coupled with non-industrial factors, have rendered Ms. 
Cox disabled and entitled to benefits. 
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This Court is charged with correction of errors committed 
by the Industrial Commission. The undisputed facts of this case 
justify a reversal of the Industrial Commission's order denying 
Cox's Motion for Review. This Court should remand to the 
Industrial Commission with directions to enter an award of 
permanent total disability benefits to Claudia Cox. 
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Determinative Statutes 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-45 
Injury arising out of or m course of em-
ployment. 
"Act of God" is not by implication excluded 
in Subdivision (5) of this section State Rd 
Comm n v Industrial Comm n, 56 Utah 252, 
190 P 544 (1920) 
Where mine superintendent was killed by 
holdup bandits as he entered store to purchase 
cigar for his own use, his death was not com-
pensable as "accidental" injury withm this sec-
tion since in order to recover for accidental in-
jury there must be some causal connection or 
relation between act causing injury and em-
ployment or duties of injured employee 
Westerdahl v State Ins Fund, 60 Utah 325, 
208 P 494 (1922) 
Where state road employee while working on 
road sought shelter from storm and was struck 
by lightning, the accident arose out of and in 
course of employment State Rd Comm'n v In-
dustrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 190 P 544 
(1920) 
Under Subdivision (5) although an employee 
is employed on the day of an accident, it cannot 
be said he is in the course of his employment 
where he steps aside to engage in an alterca-
tion with some third person concerning a per-
sonal grievance wholly unrelated to matters 
connected with his employment Wilkerson v 
Industrial Comm n, 71 Ltah 355, 266 P 270 
(1928) 
Wife of deceased drugstore employee was not 
entitled to compensation where she did not sus-
tain burden of proving that typhoid fever was 
result of injurv received in course of his em-
ployment Chase v Industrial Commn, 81 
Utah 141, 17 P2d 205 (1932) 
Death of beer truck driver after being taken 
to the hospital when he had a severe pain in 
his chest after making his second morning de-
livery, did not result from an accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, 
where substance of opinions of medical panel 
was that death from coronary thrombosis with 
myocardial infarction was not caused from the 
exertion of deceased's work on that morning 
Burton v Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 353, 
374 P2d 439 (1962) 
Regular course of employment. 
Bricklayer killed in automobile accident 
while returning home from work was not killed 
in an accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment despite fact that decedent's hourly 
wage had been increased due to location of con-
struction site, increased hourly wage did not 
constitute pav for travel time Barney v Indus-
trial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P 2d 1271 
(1973) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 C J S Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 1 
A.L.R. — Suicide as compensable under 
Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A L R 3d 
616 
Workmen's compensation injury or death 
due to storms, 42 A L R 3d 385 
Workmen's compensation injury sustained 
while attending employer-sponsored social af-
fair as arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment, 47 A L R 3d 566 
Master and servant employer's liability for 
injury caused by food or drink purchased by 
employee in plant facilities, 50 A L R 3d 505 
Workers' compensation law as precluding 
employee s suit against employer for third per-
son's criminal attack, 49 A L R 4th 926 
Workers' compensation sexual assaults as 
compensable, 52 A L R 4th 731 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
e= 47 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the depen-
dents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and, m case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-67 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, 
the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Perma-
nent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a findmg by the 
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt 
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process 
of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (0 (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-
week entitlement, compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per 
week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) 
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation 
rate under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average 
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks 
of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent 
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of 
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier 
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable perma-
nent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer 
°r its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Sec-
tion 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection 
(2), the compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be 
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the 
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same 
period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings have 
occurred: 
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35-1-67 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and 
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under 
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. The commission 
shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use in the rehabilitation 
and training of the employee. 
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of 
Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has 
fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the em-
ployee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a 
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regard-
ing rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally dis-
abled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, 
and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable 
of returning to regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has 
been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where 
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for 
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensa-
tion, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort 
under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both 
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body 
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated ac-
cording to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability is 
required in any such instance. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L. ment substituted "$ 120" for "$110" in the first 
1988, ch. 116, § 4. sentence of the second paragraph. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988, Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last ch. 160 provided: "This act takes effect upon 
amended by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating approval by the governor, or the day following 
to permanent total disability, effective July 1, t h e constitutional time limit of Article VII, 
1988, and enacts the present section. Sec- 8 w i t l } o u t t h e governor's signature, or in 
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend- fcAhe c a s e / * v e u t o ; J ^ Qda te o f v e t ° ° V e m d e -
Approved March 18, 1985. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Arm injuries. 
Commencement of benefits. 
Determination of character of disability. 
Estoppel. 
Eye injuries. 
Findings. 
Law in effect. 
Maximum benefits. 
Multiple injuries. 
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Appendix B: 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92000255 
CLAUDIA COX, 
* 
* 
* 
Applicant, 
* 
vs. * 
• 
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/ * 
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE and * 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * £ * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 
5, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by 
Edward B. Havas, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Rinehart 
Peshell, Attorney. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits in relation to 3 industrial incidents occurring while the 
applicant was employed by Utah Power and Light (one in December of 
1987, and two others that the applicant feels caused her permanent 
total disability, one on August 15, 1988 and one on July 9, 1990). 
No application for hearing was filed with resepct to the December 
1987 incident, but it has been dealt with through out the 
litigation in this matter. The carrier and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund deny that the applicant is permanently totally 
disabled as a result of any of her work injuries. The carrier 
argues that the 1988 and 1990 incidents contributed little to the 
applicant's already impaired cervical and lumbar spine and the 
carrier argues that the 1990 incident may be non-compensable. In 
support of this argument, the carrier points out that the applicant 
had all her spinal surgeries prior to the 1988 industrial incident 
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and the carrier notes that the applicant continued to work until 
July 1990. The applicant counters that the 1988 accident did 
indeed significantly worsen her condition and that she continued to 
work thereafter only because she maintained herself on pain 
medication. Both the carrier and the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
also question whether the applicant is truly unable to work at any 
job. At the time of the hearing, the applicant was in the process 
of appealing a denial of Social Security Disability benefits and 
the Social Security Disability records and other vocational 
assessment included in the medical record exhibit at the time of 
the hearing suggested that the applicant could possibly still work. 
However, just after the medical panel submitted its report to the 
Commission, the applicant was awarded Social Security'Disability 
benefits pursuant to an order dated December 21, 1992. The order 
was presented to the ALJ on January 20, 1993. 
At hearing, a joint medical record exhibit was not ready for 
submission and instead a partial group of records were admitted 
into evidence after much argument as to what records were 
admissable. The ALJ gave the parties an extension of time post-
hearing to submit the rest of the joint exhibit, but confusion 
ensued when additional records were submitted by the applicant 
without an indication as to whether the records were duplicative of 
records already admitted and without an indication as to whether 
the additional submissions had been agreed to by the carrier and 
the Employers Reinsurance Fund. Finally, per a conference call in 
early October 1992, the parties confirmed that all records that the 
Commission had at that time were to be considered the joint exhibit 
and the ALJ was informed at that time that there might be 
duplicates in the records that had been submitted. Rather than 
return the records to the parties to prepare an acceptable exhibit 
without duplicates, the ALJ decided to weed out the duplicates 
herself and after doing so, the ALJ admitted the medical record 
exhibit and marked it as Exhibit A-l. The records reflected a 
medical controversy regarding what portion of the applicant's 
impairment was related to the industrial incidents. Therefore, the 
ALJ determined that the matter would be referred to a medical panel 
for additional input. 
The medical panel report was received at the Industrial 
Commission on December 16, 1992 and was distributed to the parties 
on December 17, 1992, with 15 days allowed for objections. Counsel 
for the applicant filed objections and/or argument regarding the 
report on January 4, 1993 and counsel for the defendant filed a 
response to this on January 8, 1993. Counsel for the applicant 
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filed a reply to the response and the Social Security Disability 
award information on January 20, 1993. The matter was considered 
ready for order on Jaunary 20, 1993. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Although the first relevant industrial event that is 
involved in this claim did not occur until December 1987, the 
applicant had a significant non-industrial injury to both her 
lumbar and cervical spine in October of 1986 and did have back 
treatment and possibly neck treatment by a chiropractor prior to 
1986. A good portion of the medical records submitted deal with 
the applicant's medical status prior to 1986 and the ALJ will 
briefly review this chronologically. 
The applicant began having unexplained right upper quadrant 
pain as early as 1963 and she was finally hospitalized for this and 
associated back pain in 1973. Through that time, it was thought to 
be related to gastro-intestinal or gall bladder problems, but the 
testing during the hospitalization failed to confirm any problem in 
the stomach, kidneys, gall bladder or intestines. From 1972 
forward, the applicant7s regular family physician or physicians 
practiced at the Emery Medical Clinic in Castledale, Utah. The 
records from that clinic note that she was seen for 
fatigue/anemia/depression and allergic rhinitits in 1973. In 1974, 
she was seen for phlebitis and heart palpitations with chest pain. 
In 1975, ovarian cysts were diagnosed and in 1977 the applicant 
began to have excessive or unusual uterine bleeding. Additional 
assessment and testing in 1982 and 1983 confirmed bilateral ovarian 
cysts and continued prolonged bleeding. In 1977, the applicant 
began working for Utah Power and Light in a clerical/accounting 
position. In 1978, the applicant began to see a chiropractor at 
Castle Chiropractic Center in Castledale, Utah. The chiropractor's 
records note that the applicant first came in in September 1978 due 
to a traumatic lumbo-sacral strain. She was seen approximately 2 
times per week in September and October of 1978. She again sought 
out chiropractic care in July of 1979 (once or twice per week) and 
in late August of 1979 (almost daily). In October of 1979, the 
applicant was seen at the Emery Medical Clinic for 
anxiety/depression and she was prescribed limbitrol. 
The applicant was seen at Castle Chiropractic Center in late 
August 1980, almost daily, and again in late 1981 almost daily, 
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tapering off in October and November of 1981. in September of 
1981, the Emery Medical Center diagnosed acute otitis media with 
perforation and the applicant was seen by Dr. G. Lund for a patch 
on the perforation. From April of 1982 through October of 1982, 
the applicant went to the chiropractor 2 to 4 times per month. In 
1983, she was seen 2 to 4 times per month in February, June, July 
and December. In 1984, the applicant was seen by Dr. C. Null, a 
cardiologist, and he diagnosed a slight heart murmur. The 
applicant underwent breast reconstruction surgery in 1984. She saw 
the chiropractor from mid-May 1984 through mid-June 1984, 3 times 
per week, and then again in August of 1984, 2 times per week. In 
October of 1984, the applicant had a complete hysterectomy and 
oopherectomy at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City. At hearing, 
the applicant recalled that she did not see the chiropractor for 
back pain after her hysterectomy, but the records do indicate that 
the applicant saw the chiropractor almost daily in late August of 
1986, tapering off in September in 1986. In October of 1986, she 
had her first significant cervical/lumbar injury. 
On October 4, 1986, the applicant was in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico on vacation at the hot air balloon festival. She was riding 
in the back of a pick-up truck, on a gravel road, chasing a hot air 
balloon when the truck hit a dip in the road. The applicant stated 
that the truck was not going very fast and she was seated with her 
legs straight out in front of her leaning on the the side of the 
truck bed. As the truck hit the dip in the road, the applicant was 
bounced up off the bed of the truck and she came down hard, still 
in a seated position. The applicant described the effect on her as 
a heavy impact and a very severe jolt. That afternoon or evening, 
the applicant called a local chiropractor in Albuquerque and he 
treated the applicant on an emergency basis, also providing her 
with a back brace and a heel lift. 
when the applicant returned to Utah, she went to see Dr. R. 
Sanders at the Castle Chiropractic Center on October 9, 1986. Dr. 
Sanders felt she had sustained multiple strains of the lumbar, 
thoracic and cervical spine. He began treating her with 
chiropractic treatments. The next doctor she saw for the 
Albuquerque injury was Dr. G. Momberger, a Salt Lake City 
orthopedist. She saw Dr. Momberger on October 28, 1986 and on an 
intake form it is noted that she had injured her neck, spine, low 
back, shoulders, knee and elbow. Responding to the cause of the 
problem, the form indicates that the applicant was picking up a 
suitcase and was bumped on August 16, 1986 (this incident was not 
discussed at hearing), with the truck incident occurring 6 weeks 
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later. The intake form also notes that BEFORE 1976 a Dr. Kazarian 
had recommended surgery and Dr. Lamb had recommended exercise only. 
There are no records from Dr. Kazarian or Dr. Lamb in the medical 
record exhibit. The same form indicates that the applicant's low 
back pain had begun in 1959. Dr. Momberger's notes indicate mid-
thoracic pain and he referred the applicant to Dr. Ward at the 
University to determine if possibly she had a connective tissue 
disorder. 
The next physician visit was on November 6, 1986, when the 
applicant was seen at the Emery Medical Clinic for depression. It 
was noted that the applicant had been followed weekly at a mental 
health clinic for the last 6 months for depression which was 
situational and related to various life set-backs. Desyrel was 
prescribed. The applicant continued with chiropractic treatments 
from Dr. Sanders through November 24, 1986, receiving an overall 
total of 14 treatments between October 9, 1986 and November 24, 
1986. Dr. Sanders's records indicate that he referred the 
applicant to Dr. L. Gaufin, at the Utah Neurological Clinc in 
Provo, Utah, on November 24, 1986 and that Dr. Gaufin had a CT scan 
done. This may be an error, because there is no record of a CT 
scan in Dr. Gaufin's records or in the Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center records, the hospital at which Dr. Gaufin normally gets his 
films. Dr. Gaufin did admit the applicant to Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center on December 2, 1986 for a myelogram and Dr. Sanders 
may be referring to this film when he states a CT scan was 
performed. After reviewing the myleogram results, Dr. Gaufin's 
final diagnoses were: 1) acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy 
secondary to centrally herniated L4-5 disc, 2) mild disc bulge L3-
4, 3) cervical radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the 
nerve roots C4-5 and C5-6 bilaterally. Upon discharge, on Decmeber 
4, 1986, Dr. Gaufin prescribed tylenol #3. The applicant was seen 
at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center several days later for what 
Dr. Gaufin describes as a post-myelogram headache with neck pain. 
The applicant was given dalmane and tylenol #3. 
On January 5, 1987, Dr. L. Gaufin performed a semi-hemi 
laminotomy, formainotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 on 
the right at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. In February of 
1986, Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Sanders that the applicant had improved 
symptoms as a result of the surgery, but that she was still 
protective and cautious about her back and used an L5 corset for 
traveling. He noted that he would consider operating on her 
herniated cervical disc as soon as she stabilized from the lumbar 
surgery. On March 4, 1987, Dr. Gaufin wrote State Farm Insurance, 
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indicating that the October 4, 1986 truck accident had produced an 
acute vertical load on the applicant's spine and subsequent 
pressure on the discs which was totally compatible with the 
symptoms she later suffered and the herniated lumbar and cervical 
discs. He states in the letter that he did not operate on the L3-4 
level because the applicant wanted to get as much wear out of that 
level as she could before proceeding with surgery. He noted that 
the applicant continued with neck, shoulder and arm symptoms and 
with headaches when she was in a vertical position. He noted that 
these symptoms were associated with the C4-5 and C5-6 discs and 
that he had scheduled her for neck surgery. The applicant was 
admitted to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on March 9, 1987 
and on March 10, 1987, Dr. Gaufin performed an anterior cervical 
disectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion C4-5 
and C5-6. 
The applicant recuperated from March of 1987 until August 
5, 1987 when Dr. Gaufin released her to return to work. During 
recuperation, Dr. Gaufin prescribed soma and tylenol #3 and the 
applicant went to the Emery Medical Clinic for estrogen supplements 
and allergy medications. The applicant testified that she had 
difficulty the first couple weeks back at work, but then got better 
and had no problems doing her work duties. Upon releasing the 
applicant to return to work, Dr. Gaufin recommended that she 
follow-up with her family physician for any medication refills she 
might need. There are almost no doctor visits except for those 
associated with medication refills at Emery Medical Clinic from the 
date of release (August 5, 1987) until December 14, 1987 when the 
applicant saw Dr. C. Null, a cardiologist, for lab tests. 
Apparently, the applicant was concerned with fatigue or low energy 
and Dr. Null confirmed with her that her test results were normal 
and that he believed her energy level was being effected by her 
recent surgeries and illnesses and that she should take vitamins. 
It was during this same month, December 1987, that the 
applicant had the first of her industrial injuries. The applicant 
stated that she was at work and that she was wearing a long skirt 
with a slippery slip underneath it. As she went to sit on her 
chair, that had rollers on the legs, she caught just the edge of 
the chair seat and then the chair rolled back and away from her as 
she slid off the end of the seat. She apparently fell to the floor 
on her buttocks and had resulting back pain and right leg pain with 
muscle spasms. However, she had no doctor visits associated with 
this incident. She did get a refill of soma on December 29, 1987 
at Emery Medical Center, but there are no actual examinations or 
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treatments for this injury. The applicant also missed no work time 
and there is no Employers First Report of Work Injury for this 
incident. 
The applicant continued to work and was able to return to 
most all activities after the 1987 surgeries. She stated that she 
did avoid very jarring type activities, like aerobics and J-
wheelers per Dr. Gaufin's instructions. She did all her housework 
and she could drive, but she did avoid mowing the lawn per her 
testimony. She had only 4 or 5 visits or calls to Emery Medical 
Center from December of 1987 until August of 1988 <ind'th«»se w* ie 
for prescription refills, only one of which was lor suina. on 
August 15, 1988, the applicant had her second industrial incident. 
She was working quickly as she was filling In for several other 
workers that were off work at the time. She was doing Carina 
O'Brien's work for her and had to get into one of her file drawers. 
The relevant drawer was the bottom drawer of a f i Le cabinet and was 
the largest drawer in the cabinet. The drawer was filled with 
paper and books, but the applicant did not know this. She was 
bending over and pulling on the drawer handle, which was about a 
foot off the floor, with her right hand, when the drawer partially 
opened and then stopped abruptly like it was stuck. The applicant 
stated that she felt something give in the middle of her back and 
her ncick, shoulder and right arm felt wrenched. She also stated 
that she felt her neck pop or give way, but that she was more 
concerned at the time regarding her low back. She stated that 
there was no one at work to fill in for her, so she remained at 
work the remainder of the shift. She stated she continued to work 
in pain and discomfort after the incident and just tried to ignore 
"it," She testified that she took pain medications and muscle 
relax€irs daily and would go strlight to bed after getting off work. 
Once again, there are no immediate doctor visits
 associated 
with this injury. The applicant testified at hearing that she did 
not want to see a doctor because she was afraid to find nit that 
she had made her condition worse once again. The nearest-in-time 
medical record is a refill of estrogen at Emery Medical Center on 
August 30, 1988. The next doctor visit, on September 29, 1988, 
relates to the need for mammography and the fact that the applicant 
wanted her cholesterol checked. The office note for this visit 
does mention that the applicant had reinjured her neck "the other 
day" and needed a soma refill. Fioricet was prescribed on 
September 30, 1988. The first mention in the records of the 
December 1987 injury and the August 15, 1988 injury is in Dr. 
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Gaufin's office note dated October 3# 1988. In that note, he 
refers to the sliding-off-the-chair incident (he indicates this was 
in October of 1987 as opposed to December 198?) and the August 15, 
1988 injury opening a heavy file drawer. The first incident he 
notes gradually resolved, but he noted that the applicant continued 
to have pain in the neck, shoulders and arms and numbness in the 
first, second and third digits of both hands (right greater than 
left) related to the August 15, 1988 incident. Some pain in the 
lumbar area was also noted. Dr. Gaufin wanted to rule out a 
recurrent disc herniation in the cervical spine, and carpal tunnel 
and thus he referred the applicant for an MRI and nerve conduction 
velocity tests and an EMG of the right upper extremity. On October 
n
, 1988, that applicant had an MRI of both the cervical and lumbar 
spine. The cervical film was read to show a stable fusion at C4-5 
and C5-6, but degenerative disc disease at C6-7, producing a bar-
type defect obliterating the thecal sac and impinging the nerve 
roots bilaterally, right greater than left. The lumbar film was 
read to show no evidence of recurrent disc injury, with a mild 
bulge at L^-SI which did not significantly impinge on the nerve 
root or thecal sac. The nerve tests done at Western Neurological 
Associates on October 7, 1988 were read as normal by Dr. J. 
Andrews. 
The applicant *jot refills of soma and tylenol #3 at Emery 
Medical Center on November 19, 1988. On November 23, 1988, Dr. 
Gaufin wrote Dr. Kotrady at Emery Medical Center indicating that he 
did not recommend surgery at that time for either the neck or back. 
He stated that he felt the applicant's 2 industrial injuries 
(December 1987 and August 15, 1988) had agrravated a pre-existing 
mild degenerative change at C6-7 and had created a mild bulge at 
L5-S1, FTP noted that the applicant might need surgery in the 
future, but for the time being he recommended anti-inflammatory 
medication, muscle relaxants and physical therapy as needed. In 
December of 1988, the applicant got refills of fioricet, tylenol #3 
and lomatil. In January 1989, she was referred for physical 
therapy, which she attended 5 times between January 19, L989 and 
February 9, 1989. In March of 1989r the applicant got refills of 
fioricet and seldane and there is an Emery Medical Center office 
note dated April 13, 1989 that indicates that the physical therapy 
had helped, but that the applicant wanted a soft cervical collar 
and a lumbar support. Tt was also noted that the physical 
therapist had recommended a TENS unit and the applicant was fitted 
for one in May of 1989. At hearing, the applicant testified that 
the physical therapy made her feel sicker. She indicated that the 
TENS unit helped sometimes. Although she continued to work, the 
applicant stated that she had her daughter do her housework for 
J it, 
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her. She felt that she could not engage in her hobby of cake 
decorating and recalls needing to lay down in order to have her 
nails done, as this takes 2 hours. She stated that she tried to 
strengthen her back by walking while wearing her neck brace and 
that she tried to adjust her computer screen at work to make it 
more comfortable for her. She also indicated that she needed to 
lay town periodically at work:. 
B = .ginning in mid-May 1989, the app] icant began to see an 
acupuncturist, Kris Ahshi. Based on the brief handwritten notes of 
the acupuncturist, the visits were not primarily for the neck or 
back (these were mentioned i n the notes for just one visit), but 
rather were for a host of other non-industrial problems including 
fatigue, bloating/edema/water retention, sinus headaches, ear pain 
and constipation. She had 6 or 7 treatments per month from June 
1989 through September of 1989 (in July only one treatment) with 
almost double that number of visits in October of 1989. During 
that period, in addition to her acupuncture treatments, the 
applicant was seen for various things at the Emery Medical Center 
including assessment for hypothyroidism in June 1989 (unconfirmed), 
for refills of tylenol #3, fioricet and soma in July 1989, for 
fioricet and naprosyn in September 1989 and for fioricet in October 
1989, and for cholesterol lab tests in September 1989. In November 
of 1989, she was seen at Emery Medical Center for neck pain and 
right arm pain and it was noted that she had been using a neck 
brace for 2 months. It was recommended that she continue using the 
brace and going to acupuncture. The 4 visits to the acupuncturist 
i n November 1989 axe accompanied by notes indicating treatment for 
cervical pain, tingling and numbness. The applicant got refills of 
fioricet, naprosyn and soma on November 20, 1989 at Emery Medical 
Center 
On Decmeber 1, 3 989, the applicant was seen at the Salt Lake 
Clinic by some physician for 1) hot flashes, 2) headaches, 3) 
fatigue, 4) allergies and 5) left upper chest pain. The physician 
noted that he would take some tests and he recommended that the 
applicant cut her premarin intake in half and that she quit taking 
provera altogether. From December 1989 through June of 1990, the 
applicant went to the acupuncturist only twice (once in March 1990 
and once in June 1990) and apparently got prescription refills only 
at Emery Medical Center. Prescription refills included Zovirax, 
fioricet (6 times), tylenol #3, naldicon, estrogen, soma (2 times), 
naprosyn, amitriptyline and prozac. The applicant testified that 
she actually worked overtime from January of 1990 through April of 
1990 as another employee failed to return from maternity leave. 
t\Cr. "•^O' 
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She indicated that tl lis extra effor t cai is< = < I her to tak^ 
medication and to use her neck brace agai n so that she could ^-ep 
up with the work- In May of 1990, a visit to Emery Medical er 
notes pain down the right arm with numbness in the right aiy. s, 
constant headache, and pain in the right leg with parasthesias in 
the toes after walking, Her visit to the acupuncturist in June of 
1990 was for leg swelling and pain. On July 2, 1990, Dr. Kotrady 
of the Emery Medical Center wrote Dr. Gaufin, recommending that the 
applicant be reevaluated by Gaufin. In that letter, he notes that 
the applicant had persisting neck pain and that at one point she 
had become dependent on fioricet, soma and tylenol #3. He notes 
that she had been intolerant to prozac and amitriptyline and that 
he recommended a pain clinic if surgery was not recommended. wo 
noted that he felt there was an emotional stress component that 
blocking any successful treatment. 
On J HI :i Ill y 9 , 199 0, just one week after Dr Kotrady sent his 
letter to Di : Gaufin, the applicant had her final industrial 
incident. The applicant stated at hearing that she was seated at 
her desk and merely turned her head with resultant neck spasm and 
symptoms on down her spine. It is somewhat unclear what exactly 
happened at work after she turned her head. There are some 
references in the medical records regarding the applicant 
collapsing on this date, but it is unclear: whether she did any more 
than just lay down. She did go to the Emery Medical Center on the 
same day and a cervical spine X-ray was done, which showed the 
prior- fusion and the C6-7 degeneration A n acute strain was 
diagnosed, and soma and lortab were prescribed. Several days later 
she was referred to physical therapy, but the applicant called to 
tell the therapist she was to wait with the physical therapy until 
she saw Dr. Gaufin per Gaufin#s instructions. On August 6, 1990, 
the applicant went to see family practitioner, Dr. S. Potter, in 
Price, Utah for hot flushes and headaches. He recommended a trial 
of prozac and some lab tests. Apparently, she thereafter made Dr. 
Potter her family doctor, but through the end of 1990 she continued 
to get prescription refills at Emery Medical Center for both her 
spinal problems (fioricet> soma, naprosyn, tyleonl #3) and for 
other ^hings like anti-depressants (prozac and provor"a• 
The applicant had a r epeat cer v ileal MRI doi le at Utah Valley 
Regional Medical Center on August 9, 1 99 0 per Dr. Gaufin#s 
referral.. This was read to show no major changes since the one 
done on October 7, 1988. Dr. Gaufin saw her on August 15, 1990 and 
he noted that she continued to have chronic neck, shoulder and arm 
pain, with the pain being better when she was laying down and worse 
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when she was sitting at work. He noted that she continued to use 
the neck collar and his impression was acute chronic cervical 
radiculopathy secondary to spondylosis and protrusion of the disc 
at C6-7 bilaterally. He recommended surgery to decompress the 
nerve roots, but he noted that the applicant would need to be very 
careful in the future due to the propensity of deterioration of the 
discs caused by stress on the joints due to a 3-level fusion. His 
office note for October 7, 1988 indicates that the applicant would 
consider whether to have the additional surgery. Dr. Gaufin's 
letter to the carrier dated October 1 , 199 0 indicates that the 
applicant opted to avoid surgery and he therefore recommended: 1) 
avoiding jolting or jarring the neck, 2) use of a soft cervical 
collar, 3) cervical traction taught by a physical therapist and 4) 
anti-inflammatory medi cation and musel e re] axants with avol dance of 
narcotics. 
In December 1990, Dr. Taylor at the Emery Medical Center 
wrote Dr. Gaufin requesting that he "do a disabiity determination11 
: i i the applicant as he believed the applicant would not be a 
dependable future employee. In response to this, the applicant saw 
Dr. Gaufin again on January 9, 1991 and Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Taylor 
a letter indicating that the applicant was at that time in such 
intense pain that she could not tolerate sitting in a chair in 
front of a table or a desk with her head flexed for 8 hours, n<;» 
noted that her care options were surgery or conservative care, but 
that nothing was going to totally "get rid" of the pain. He noted 
that there was a general reduced success rate for 3rd surgeries and 
that the applicant would experience a continued wearing out process 
with age. He states in the letter that there would be a point at 
which surgery would not help. He found that the applicant 
continued to be termporarily totally disabled and that she would 
continue to use traction and see if she got her better enough to 
return to work. In January. 1991, Dr. Taylor again wrote Dr. 
Gaufin asking him to rate the applicant. The applicant applied for 
Social Security Disability on January 28, 1991 and got refills of 
prozac, tylenol #3, soma, fioricet and naprosyn at the Emery 
Medical Center on January 31 , . ••-; Dr Gaufin saw the applicant 
for the last time on March 18, 1991 when he rated her as having a 
33% whole person impairment due to her industrial injuries, a 
combined rating of 20% lumbar and 16% cervical impairment. Not 
included in his rating was a 7% whole person rating for the neck 
and 8% fr^ w" ^  -,i^ a>- spi ne d\ le to the surgeries i r. IQAT 
of the applicant at the request of the ca.^v..
 AA^  nw^ed thai: the 
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applicant's I : wo major1* complaints were: 1 ) constant neck pain with 
numbness and tingling made worse by sitting, standing in one spot 
and walking and made better by laying down with pillows under the 
neck, pain medications and muscle relaxers and 2) constant back 
pain from the mid-back to the low back radiating down her leg to 
her toe, better when she was laying down, walking or taking 
medication and generally more tolerable than the neck pain. He 
found that the applicant was medically stable and that surgery was 
advisable only if muscle atrophy occurred, muscle weakness became 
progressive or a free fragment was discovered. He found surgery 
was not advisable if the applicant merely had progressive pain 
symptoms. He found that the applicant had a combined total 
impairment from both the lumbar and cervical spine of 34%. He 
breaks this rating down, but his breakdown is a little confusing. 
Nonetheless i t does appear that he feels that the vast majority of 
the rating was caused *- * fc_ *--.r>' — •-ry and ensuing 1 987 
surgeries. 
,. < ai id J i i] y 1991 , the app] icant saw Dr. S Potter for 
ssion and headaches and in July of 1991 the applicant returned 
o u.r c, h i I for increasing symptoms of precordial pressure, 
aching ana tightness seeming to occur with activity. His diagnoses 
were: 1) mitral valve prolapse syndrome, 2) anginal syndrome, 3) 
intermittent episodes of arterial hypertension in the past, 4) 
prior spine injuries and 5) prior hysterectomy. Dr. Null noted 
that the applicant needed to get her cholesterol level down. The 
applicant saw Dr , J. Heiner in August 1991, apparently to get a 
second opinion regarding her neck and low back symptoms. His 
office note from this visit makes some observations, but there are 
no real conclusions stated in the note. He did take lumbar and 
cervical X-rays. Dr. Potter referred the applicant for acupuncture 
again in September of 1991 and the applicant had 5 treatments in a 
2-month period from mid-September 1991 through mid-November 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, Social Security issued its initial decision 
denying the applicant disability benefits. The order notes that it 
was determined that the applicant could work an 8-hour day with 
norma,. 1 breaks. 
On November 7, ] 991, the applicant saw Dr. S. potter and he 
noted a new symptom. The applicant was having difficulty closing 
her hands. He referred the applicant for a rheumatoid factor ] ab 
test and his November 21, 1991 office note inddicates that this 
came back negative. He prescribed fioricet, physical therapy and 
a nerve conduction velocity test. The applicant had 10 acupuncture 
treatments from November 29, 1991 through December l-^l 
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December 20, 1991 Dr. J. Watkins, a nerurologistf wrote Dr. L. 
Gaufin indicating that he had seen the applicant for a tingling 
sensation in both hands and in the right arm along with 
intermittent loss of grip and tingling in front of her left ear 
which all began as of July 9, 1990. Numbness in the first 3 
digits of the hands was also reported along with occasional 
drooling from the right side of the mouth. Dr. Watkins recommended 
nerve conduction velocity tests, EMGs of both upper extremities and 
an MRI of the brain. He wrote Dr. Gaufin on January 22, 1992 that 
these tests came back normal. Dr. Potter refilled the applicant's 
fioricet, tylenol #3, feldene, prozac and soma in January of 1992. 
On February 6, 1992, Dr. Potter also prescribed desyrel for neck 
symptoms and emotional stress and he informed the applicant's 
attorney that the desyrel was related to her industrial injuries. 
On March 1, 1992, he wrote the applicant's attorney and notified 
him that the medications that he was refilling (prozac, feldene, 
tylenol #3, fioricet and naprosyn) were all necessary due -to the 
applicant's industrial injuries. 
On March 5, 1992, Dr. Watkins wrote Dr. Gaufin and noted 
that the applicant had also developed dizzy symptoms and that she 
had gone off all medications and was trying meclizine for the 
dizziness. On March 30, 1992, Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, wrote a 
letter to-whom-it-may concern noting that he had seen the applicant 
10 times in counseling and that the applicant had experienced some 
improvement as a result, but continued to grieve over the loss of 
her job and health. He concluded that it was difficult to 
accomplish much in therapy until the issue regarding, her Social 
Security Disability was settled. He stated that he could see no 
way that she would be able to return to work and he recommended a 
speedy disability retirement. On March 31, 1992, a functional 
capacity evaluation was done through Carbon Emery Physical 
Therapy/Alta Health Services and this resulted in a classification 
for the applicant of light/sedentary work. It was noted that the 
applicant did not have good control of her pain and that she was 
limited by this and her fear of reinjury. 
On April 6, 1992, the applicant saw Dr. J. Matthews who 
diagnosed her as having fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory 
polyarthritis. He noted that he wanted to rule out multiple 
sclerosis, lyme disease and hypothryroidism. He referred the 
applicant for lab tests and he did X-rays of her hands. He gave he 
an injection of adlone and prescribed cyclobenzodrine. Dr. Potter 
saw the applicant again on May 19, 1992 and he noted hand pain and 
leg swelling and he noted a possible diagnosis of fibromyacitis and 
om?fi 
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fatigue. He prescribed amitriptylline. The applicant was seen in 
the emergency room of Castleview Hospital on May 31, 1992 for neck 
and back pain and she was given an injection of demerol/phenergan 
and was sent home with percocet. Dr. Matthews's office note for 
June 1, 1992 adds two other diagnoses: hypothryroidism and chronic 
pain. He prescribed synthroid in addition to the cyclobenzodrine 
and indicated he would recheck her in 3 months. On June 29, 1992, 
the applicant requested a hearing with Social Security in order to 
reassess her entitlement to disability benefits. 
There is a Career Guidcance Center report dated June 15, 
1992 which concludes that there are jobs available for which the 
applicant is trained, but that she may have difficulty finding an 
employer willing to make the accommodations that are necessary in 
order for her to tolerate the workplace. The applicant has been 
receiving long term disability benefits since shortly after the 
July 9, 1990 incident but it is unclear in what amount and how long 
the benefits will continue. As of October of 1992, the Social 
Security Disability litigation was still in progress with no final 
result made known to the ALJ. 
The applicant testified that since the July 9, 1990 
incident, she was reduced to even less activity than she performed 
after the August 15, 1988 accident. She characterized her activity 
level as "totally down." She stated that she had a hard time even 
walking and could do no housework. She stated that she wore her 
neck brace for traveling and when she was unable to lay down. She 
stated that she was unable to drive for one year as she could not 
turn her head. At the time of the hearing, the applicant stated 
that she had constant pain in her neck (she wore her cervical 
collar at the hearing) and that she had reduced range of motion in 
the neck due to pain when she tried to turn her head. She stated 
that she had to lay still in the morning for a couple of hours 
before she could move her head. She stated that she no longer 
walks to help her back pain because this jars her neck. She stated 
that she can sit or stand for only 30 minutes at a time before the 
pain gets bad and then she needs to lay back, put her legs up or 
use her neck brace. She stated that it is painful to have her neck 
bent over looking at her desk or keyboard. 
With respect to education ahd work experience, the applicant 
stated that she graduated from South Emery Highschool in Ferron, 
Utah and had only typing classes thereafter. She stated that she 
worked for 20 years, initially as a retail sales clerk in a women's 
00377 
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apparel store and later in several accounting/clerical positions. 
She feels that her limited ability to sit with her neck bent over 
a desk or keyboard prevents her from returning to 
clerical/accounting work and she feels that she can no longer do 
the bending, lifting, reaching and work on her feet that is 
required in a retail sales clerk position. 
The medical panel consisted of Chairman, Dr. Madison Thomas# 
a neurologist and panel member Dr. B. Holbrook, an orthopedist. 
Their report was received at the Commission on December 16, 1992. 
The panel report concludes that there is a causal connection 
between the applicant's symptoms and the three industrial injuries 
at issue as well as a connection between her symptoms and pre-
existing conditions or injuries. The panel is not specific about 
what symptoms it refers to, but the panel specifically talks about 
neck symptoms with radiation and problems in the right upper 
extremity and low back symptoms radiating into the right lower 
extremity. The panel found that the applicant's December 1987 work 
injury and the August 15, 1988 work injury did not result in any 
temporary total disability, with the July 9, 1990 work injury 
resulting in 3 or 4 weeks of temporary disability. With respect to 
impairment, the panel apportioned the applicant's impairment as 
follows: 
prior to 10-4-86 12-87 8-15-88 7-9-90 
1986 
cervical 
spine-17% 1.70% 11.90% 0.85% 2.55% 0.00% 
lumbar 
spine-14% 3.50% 9.80% 0.42% 0.28% 0.00% 
hypothy-
roidism 5.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
TOTAL 10.20% 21.70% 1.27% 2.83% 0.00% 
The panel concluded that the treatment that the applicant has had 
was attributable to the accidents in the proportion represented by 
the impairment percentages and that the applicant's psychological 
status (depression with pre-existing personality disorder) was the 
result of multiple non-industrial factors. 
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On January 4, 1993, the ALJ received objections/argument 
from counsel for the applicant. In that filing, counsel objects to 
the panel's finding that no temporary total disability was 
attributable to the 1988 accident and that only 3 weeks of 
temporary total disability was attibutable to the 1990 accident. 
Counsel cites the indications of inability to return to work made 
by Dr. Gaufin and Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, in 1991 and 1992 as 
support for this objection. Counsel also notes that the panel did 
attribute some impairment to the 1987 and 1988 injuries and 
suggests that temporary disability should be proportional to the 
impairment noted by the panel. Counsel also argues that the panel 
should have attributed at least some of the applicant's depression 
to the industrial injuries since the social disruption that is 
cited as part of the cause of the depression resulted due to the 
applicant's loss of her job. Counsel for the defendants filed a 
response to these objections on January 8, 1993 pointing out that 
the July 9, 1990 injury is non-compensable as a result of the Allen 
case and since the applicant discontinued work due to this non-
compensable incident, any depression resulting therefrom is also 
non-compensable. 
On January 20, 1993, counsel for the applicant filed a reply 
to the response filed by counsel for the defendants. That reply 
indicates that the applicant is no longer contending that the July 
9, 1990 injury is a separate compensable accident, but rather just 
the date when the applicant discontinued work as a result of 
injuries incurred in the 1987 and 1988 accidents. Attahced to the 
reply of counsel for the applicant is the December 21, 1992 award 
of Social Security Disability benefits. The decision notes that 
the applicant was found to be first disabled as of July 9, 1990, 
when she discontinued her work with Utah Power and Light. The 
findings of the ALJ who issued the decision cite the following 
impairments as the impairments that were relevant to the award of 
disability benefits: 
[A] history of lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, 
and cervical disk surgery in March 1987; post 
traumatic right, greater than left hand numbness 
with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain; 
fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory polyarthritis; 
polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; degenerative joint 
disease; degenerative disc disease; depression; and 
passive dependent personality disorder. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Adoption of Medical Panel Report; 
The ALJ adopts the medical panel report to resolve the 
issues of causation and impairment in this matter. The panel alone 
has had access to all the applicant's medical records and thus the 
panel report is the only expert medical evidence in this case that 
is based on a complete medical history, as well as the applicant's 
hearing testimony. Although some of the applicant's medical care 
providers have pointed to the applicant's back and neck problems 
and her loss of her job as causes of her current disability, none 
have indicated clearly that the industrial injuries are the sole 
cause of her back and neck problems and the loss of her job. 
Therefore, there is no medical evidence that specifically refutes 
the panel's findings. As it is the best founded and most complete 
medical analysis in this case and as it is not specifically refuted 
by any other evidence, the ALJ adopts the medical panel conclusions 
as her own. 
Compensability/Relevancy of the 3 Industrial Accidents: 
The applicant did not file an application for hearing 
regarding the December 1987 industrial accident. Technically, this 
means that this accident is not part of the litigation that has 
gone forward in this case. The applicant missed no time from work 
as a result of this injury and saw no doctor specifically for this 
injury. The panel found a .85 % whole person cervical impairment 
and a .42% whole person low back impairment, or less than 2% whole 
person impairment, resulting from this injury. Clearly, it is not 
a significant injury and the applicant has not claimed it as having 
caused her permanent total disability. As such, the ALJ will 
consider the injury irrelevant for purposes of analyzing the 
permanent total disability claim. 
The 1990 injury must be considered non-compensable. Per the 
medical panel report, the applicant clearly had significant 
permanent impairment to her cervical and lumbar spine at the time 
of this injury. Therefore, per the legal causation requirements 
outlined in the case Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 
00380 
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(Utah 1986), in order for the 1990 injury to be compensable, the 
applicant must be able to show that the July 9, 1990 injury was 
incurred pursuant to exertion greater than what is expended in non-
employment life by individuals in the latter part of the 20th 
century. Since the description of the accident amounts to merely 
turning her head, the injury is not a separate compensable 
industrial accident. In addition, the panel attributed no 
impairment whatsoever to this incident. However, the ALJ should 
note that the applicant appears to now indicate that she is not 
claiming the July 9, 1990 incident as a separate compensable 
accident (per counsel for the applicants January 12, 1993 letter 
to the ALJ) , but rather that it is merely the date when she 
discontinued working due to her earlier industrial accidents. In 
essence, the applicant has withdrawn her claim that the July 9, 
1990 incident is the cause of her permanent total disability. As 
such, the ALJ will not consider the July 9, 1990 incident in 
analyzing the applicant's claim for permanent total disability. 
Based on the foregoing two paragraphs, only the August 15, 
1988 accident is left as a possible industrial cause of the 
applicant's claimed permanent total disability. There has been no 
argument by the carrier that this incident was not a compensable 
industrial accident and thus the ALJ finds that this case boils 
down to a determination as to whether the August 15, 1988 
compensable industrial injury is the cause of the applicant's 
current permanent total disability. 
The Cause of the Applicant's Permanent Total Disability: 
In order to be entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits, the applicant must be able to show that the industrial 
injury at issue actually caused the permanent total disability. 
Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Co. , 717 P. 2d 713 (Utah 
1986), Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 
1988) . The applicant's testimony, taken by itself, states that she 
recovered, returned to work and to most activities after her 1986 
non-industrial injury and her two 1987 surgeries that followed. 
The applicant testified that after the August 15, 1988 industrial 
injury, she became considerably worse and was forced to work in 
pain with the assistance of medication. She indicated that she 
needed to lay down periodically during the day, and especially 
after work. Per the applicant, she needed help with her housework 
and needed to use a neck brace in order to walk for exercise. All 
of these things the applicant attributes to the effects of the 
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August 15, 1988 injury, as she was not experiencing these 
limitations just prior to the August 15, 1988 injury. In addition, 
the applicant claims that her limitations actually became more 
severe after the July 9, 1990 incident where she turned her head at 
work. The applicants testimony that she was worse after the 
August 15, 1988 injury is supported in the medical records by an 
indication of increase medication usage after that injury. Also, 
the records suggest increased complaints of neck and arm symptoms 
in late 1988 and in 1989. 
Looking at just the applicants testimony, there is 
certainly an argument that the applicant's disabling symptoms 
gradually increased after the August 15, 1988 injury, thus strongly 
suggesting that the August 15, 1988 injury was the cause of her 
eventual complete disability beginning in July of 1990. However, 
there is alot of other evidence that leads one to the conclusion 
that the August 15, 1988 injury only minimally contributed to the 
applicant's overall disability. First, following the 1986 non-
industrial injury at the balloon show in New Mexico, the applicant 
had two separate surgeries on her spine and was off work for a 
total of 7 to 8 months. In contrast, neither the 1987 nor the 1988 
injury resulted in any immediate need for medical care and both 
involved no lost work time. No new objective findings on the 
applicant's X-rays were noted as a result of these two injuries. 
Also, the applicant was working overtime as late as 1990. The 
obvious conclusion from this comparison is that the 1986 non-
industrial injury was much more significant medically than were the 
1987 and 1988 industrial injuries. The minimal significance of the 
two industrial injuries is also supported by the medical panel 
impairment ratings, which attribute 80% of the applicant's neck 
impairment and 95% of the applicant's low back impairment to causes 
other than the industrial injuries. 
Secondly, the medical records reflect a number of non-
industrial medical problems that the applicant was experiencing in 
1988, 1989 and 1990. These other problems, some of which required 
significant treatment, could have affected the applicant's ability 
and motivation to continue working. The applicant saw the 
acupuncturist, Dr. Kotrady and Dr. Potter for fagtiue, bloating, 
sinus headaches, ear problems, hot flushes, drug dependency and 
high cholesterol. In addition, Dr. Matthews diagnosed 
fibromyalgia, polyarthritis and hypothroidism in 1992 and he did 
not mention that any of these were related to the applicant's 
industrial injuries. Finally, the applicant was treated 
sporadically both before and after the industrial injuries for 
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depression/anxiety. Certainly, this condition must effect the 
applicants motivation to continue working. There is no medical 
opinion that this problem is solely caused by the industrial 
injuries. The medical panel found that the applicant may need 
psychiatric care at this point, but that this is the result of 
multiple non-industrial factors. 
Lastly, there is the Social Security Disability decision to 
consider. This decision lists 10 separate medical problems that 
contribute to the applicant's disability status (see quote in 
Findings of Fact). Four of the problems are clearly unrelated to 
the industrial injuries (the 1987 surgeries, hypothyroidism, 
depression and passive dependent personality disorder). There is 
a possiblity that the industrial injuries may have contributed in 
some degree to the remaining 6 problems listed, but there is no 
medical evidence that in fact this is the case. The medical 
records simply do not resolve what has caused or even aggravated 
the hand problems, the fibromyalgia, the polyarthritis, the 
polypharmacy, the degenerative joint disease or the degenerative 
disc disease. Even if one presumed that all of these conditions 
were aggravated by the industrial injuries, the medical panel 
report indicates that the medical care for these problems is 
attributed to the industrial injuries in the same percentages that 
is reflected by the impairment percentages. Once again, even 
making a presumption heavily in favor of the applicant, without any 
real supporting evidence for such a presumption, the result is that 
the industrial injuries contributed little to the need for medical 
care related to these problems. 
The ALJ feels that there are cases where industrial injuries 
involving minimal impairment aggravate pre-existing medical 
problems sufficiently to support a finding that the injuries caused 
the permanent total disability. There is certainly some merit to 
the "straw-that-broke-the-camel's-back" theory. However, there 
needs to be more than just the applicant's testimony to support 
such a theory. If one can show that there was an need for 
increased immediate medical care or a clear period of disability 
and inability to work that followed the industrial injury, then the 
actual impairment percentage attributed to the industrial injury 
takes on less significance. In this case, as discussed above, 
those other factors are not present so as to allow the ALJ to 
discount the minimal impairment that the industrial injury or 
injuries caused. In addition, the applicant had significant pre-
existing impairment in the same areas of the body that the 
applicant currently indicates are the source of her disaiblity and 
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there are many non-industrial injuries that appear to be 
influencing her overall disability. The ALJ finds that the 
preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the 
August 15, 1988 injury is the cause of her current permanent total 
disability. 
The Objections to the Medical Panel Report; 
The applicant's attorney objects to the panel's finding that 
no temporary total disability (TTD) is attributable to the 1987 or 
1988 injuries. Counsel suggests that the panel should* have found 
TTD in proportion to the impairment rated by the panel for the 
industrial injuries. However, the ALJ believes the panel found no 
TTD related to these injuries simply because the facts of the case 
reflect that the applicant just kept working after both the 1987 
and 1988 injuries. The panel felt there was only TTD of 3 or 4 
weeks following the July 9, 1990 incident and the panel was 
unwilling to consider this as caused by the 1987 or 1988 injuries. 
There is certainly nothing inconsistent in stating that the 3 or 4 
weeks of disability following the July 9, 1990 incident was caused 
by the July 9, 1990 incident. To the ALJ, the panel's findings 
related to the TTD are entirely consistent and logical. Finally, 
it is true that Dr. Gaufin and Delvin McFarlane felt the applicant 
was disabled in 1991 and 1992, but neither definitively states this 
was due to the only compensable injury at issue, the August 15, 
1988 accident. As such, the panel's conclusions regarding the TTD 
are not refuted by either Dr. Gaufin or Delvin McFarlane. 
Counsel for the applicant argues that some portion of the 
applicant's depression must be attributed to the applicant's August 
15, 1988 industrial injury, because the panel admitted that social 
disruption caused by loss of her job was contributing to her 
depression. However, it has not been established that the 
applicant lost her job due to the August 15, 1988 industrial 
injury. She worked for nearly 2 years following that injury and 
thus there is not even a temporal inference that can be made with 
respect to the 1988 injury causing the discontinuance of work. The 
ALJ finds that the applicant may have stopped working due to the 
July 9, 1990 injury, but this is not clearly established as counsel 
for the defendants suggests in his response to the applicant's 
objections. More than likely, there are a number of reasons for 
the applicant's decision to stop working in July of 1990. As the 
applicant was being treated for depression as early as 1973, and as 
her cessation of work has not been clearly linked to the 1988 
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accident, the ALJ does not find inconsistent the panel's conclusion 
that the depression is the result on multiple non-industrial 
factors. 
Concluding Remarks: 
The ALJ makes no separate finding with respect to the 
applicant's ability to work at this point. It is unnecessary to 
rule on this issue since the ALJ finds that any disability that may 
exist is not attributable to the August 15, 1988 industrial 
accident. However, just as commentary, it does appear that the 
applicant is probably totally disabled due to multiple factors as 
noted in the Social Security decision. Because the ALJ feels 
sympathy for the applicant and the difficult time she has had, the 
ALJ wishes she could just accept the applicant's testimony and 
award benefits. Unfortunately, the ALJ feels she cannot ignore the 
other substantial evidence that does not support the applicant's 
theory of the cause of her disability. The ALJ considered awarding 
the applicant just the very minimal permanent partial impairment 
(PPI) that is supported by the medical panel report, but it appears 
that the carrier has paid alot more TTC (from July 10, 1990 through 
March 4, 1991) than is supported by the panel report and this 
completely offsets any PPI that would be payable. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits and any alternative claim for 
temporary total compensation or permanent impairment benefits 
associated with the industrial injuries of August 15, 1988 and July 
9, 1990 is dismissed with prejudice. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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Order Denying Motion for Review 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 
CLAUDIA COX, 
Applicant, 
v. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, ENERGY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE and EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the 
motion for review of respondent in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63 
-46b-12. 
The provisions of U.C.A. Sections 35-1-1 et. seq. are 
applicable in this case. 
The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to 
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action 
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the 
commission.11 U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 (1953). 
The statutes further provide that: 
A substantial compliance with the requirements of 
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give 
effect to the orders of the commission, and they 
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void 
for any omission of a technical nature. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-33 (1953). 
The Commission has "the duty ... and ... full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to ... administer and enforce all laws 
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1) (a) (1953), and to "consider 
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953). 
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted 
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88 
(1965) which provides: 
...The commission may make its investigation in 
such manner as in its judgment is best calcula-
ted to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of 
* 
* 
* 
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the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearings, and 
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the 
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision. This 
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate 
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or 
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the workers' 
compensation act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules. 
Id. 
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the 
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority 
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the 
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena. 
The applicant filed this motion for review challenging the 
ALJ's ruling that she failed to prove that her permanent total 
disability ("PTD") was caused by her industrial accident of August 
15, 1988. The applicant argues that she is entitled to benefits 
because she showed a "medically demonstrable causal link" under 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) between 
her August 15, 1988 industrial accident and her disability. The 
respondent asserts that Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 
954 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) requires that a claimant "prove medically 
that his disability was caused by an industrial accident." 
Finally, the applicant asserts that under the odd-lot doctrine, she 
is entitled to PTD benefits. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a claimant for workers' compensation benefits who has a pre-
existing condition must prove both legal and medical causation1 
before he is entitled to benefits. The Court discussed the causal 
connection required to sustain a claim for permanent total 
disability benefits in Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 
P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). Hodges requires that a claimant for 
permanent total disability benefits prove that his disability was 
caused by an industrial accident. Id. at 721. The Utah Court of 
Appeals applied Allen and Hodges to sustain the commission's denial 
of benefits to a PTD claimant whose disability was determined to be 
the result of pre-existing conditions and not an industrial 
1
 Legal causation requires a showing that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced in everyday life because of his pre-existing condition. 
Medical causation requires a showing that the disability is 
medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during 
work related activity. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 
15, 27 (Utah 1986). 
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accident. Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1988)• 
It is important to note that there is a distinction between 
the terms "impairment" and "disability." "Impairment" is a medical 
appraisal of the "nature and extent of the patient's illness or 
injury as it affects his personal efficiency in one or more of the 
activities of daily living." "Disability" is the worker's 
impairment of earning capacity. Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. 
Industrial Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140, n. 3 (Utah 1981). A 
determination of whether a claimant is permanently and totally 
disabled is a question of fact. On review, an ALJ's 
determination of factual issues must be supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). We will review the record to 
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the ALJ's finding that the applicant did not become 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of her August 15, 1988 
industrial injury. 
Review of the medical records shows that the applicant first 
sought chiropractic care from Castle Chiropractic for lumbo-sacral 
strain in September 1978. She continued to see her chiropractor as 
needed through November 1991. In October 1986, the applicant was 
riding in the back of a pickup truck chasing a hot air balloon in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, when the truck hit a dip in the road which 
caused her to bounce up off the bed of the truck and land hard on 
her buttocks in a seated position. She sought emergency 
chiropractic care that evening at Care More Chiropractic in 
Albuquerque, and was provided a back brace for her trip home to 
Utah. 
Upon her return, the applicant was treated by Dr. R. Sanders 
at Castle Chiropractic Center. Dr. Sanders referred her to Dr. 
Gaufin at the Utah Neurological Clinic on November 24, 1986. Dr. 
Gaufin diagnosed acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary 
to a centrally herniated L4-5 disc, mild disc bulge L3-4, cervical 
radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the nerve roots at C4-
5 and C5-6 bilaterally and prescribed pain medication. Dr. Gaufin 
performed a semi-hemi laminotomy, foraminotomy and nerve root 
decompression at L4-5 on the right at Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center on January 5, 1987. He performed an anterior cervical 
discectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion at 
C4-5 and C5-6 on March 10, 1987. 
The applicant was released to return to work on August 5, 1987 
and sought follow up care with her family physician at Emery 
Medical Clinic. The medical records show that the applicant saw 
her doctor primarily for medication refills during the period from 
August 5, 1987 to December 14, 1987. 
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Sometime during December 1987, the exact date is not noted in 
the record, the applicant suffered the first of three alleged 
industrial injuries. As she attempted to sit at her desk, her 
chair which was equipped with wheels, rolled away and she fell to 
the floor landing on her buttocks. The applicant sought no 
immediate medical care as a result of this fall, but did refill her 
prescription for Soma on December 29, 1987. The applicant missed 
no work and no Employer's First Report of Injury was filed for this 
incident. The application for a hearing alleged that the applicant 
suffered industrial accidents on August 15, 1988 and July 9, 1990. 
The ALJ considered the December 1987 injury irrelevant to the 
applicant's PTD claim. 
A second industrial incident occurred on August 15, 1988. The 
applicant was doing work for one of her co-workers, Carma O'Brien, 
who was off that day. As the applicant attempted to open the 
bottom drawer of Ms. O'Brien's file cabinet, the drawer stuck and 
the applicant felt something give in the middle of her back, and 
her neck, shoulder and right arm felt wrenched. She completed her 
shift on August 15, 1988 and continued to work thereafter. The 
applicant testified that, following this accident, she took pain 
medications and muscle relaxants daily and went straight to bed 
after work. There were no immediate doctor's visits associated 
with the August 15, 1988 injury. 
The first mention of the December 1987 and August 15, 1988 
accidents in the medical records was in Dr. Gaufin's office note 
dated October 3, 1988. Dr. Gaufin referred the applicant for an 
MRI of her cervical and lumbar spine. The cervical films were read 
to show a stable fusion at C4-5 and C5-6, and degenerative disc 
disease at C6-7, producing a bar type defect obliterating the 
thecal sac and impinging on the nerve roots bilaterally, greater on 
the right than the left. The lumbar films showed no evidence of a 
recurrent disc injury, but a mild bulge not impinging on the nerve 
root or thecal sac was noted at L5-S1. Nerve conduction tests 
performed on October 7, 1988 were read as normal by Dr. J. Andrews 
at Western Neurological Associates. In a November 23, 1988 letter 
to Dr. Kotrady at Emery Medical Center, Dr. Gaufin opined that the 
applicant's industrial accidents had aggravated a pre-existing mild 
degenerative change at C6-7 and created a mild bulge at L5-S1. 
Conservative treatment was recommended. 
The applicant continued to use pain medications and muscle 
relaxants. She also tried physical therapy and acupuncture for 
pain control. The applicant continued to work, although she 
testified that her daughter helped with housework and she was 
unable to engage in her hobby of cake decorating. However, the 
applicant worked overtime between January and April of 1990 after a 
co-worker failed to return from maternity leave. In May 1990, the 
applicant complained of pain down her right arm, numbness in her 
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right hand, constant headaches, and pain in the right leg with 
parasthesias in the toes after walking. Dr. Kotrady wrote Dr. 
Gaufin on July 2, 1990 recommending that the applicant be 
reevaluated by Gaufin. Kotrady stated that he would recommend a 
pain clinic if Gaufin determined that surgery was not the 
recommended course of treatment. Dr. Kotrady believed that there 
was an emotional stress component blocking successful treatment of 
the applicant's symptoms. 
On July 9, 1990, the applicant suffered her final industrial 
incident. She was sitting at her desk and turned her head, 
bringing on muscle spasms in her neck and spine. The applicant 
went to the Emery Medical Center that day and a cervical X-ray was 
made which showed no changes from previous studies. An acute 
strain was diagnosed and Soma and Lortab were prescribed. Physical 
therapy was postponed until after the applicant saw Dr. Gaufin. An 
MRI was done on at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on August 9, 
1990. The MRI showed no major changes since the previous MRI 
performed on October 7, 1988. This incident is not a compensable 
industrial accident under Allen, because the applicant's employment 
did not contribute anything substantial to increase the risk she 
already faced in nonemployment life. 
Dr. Gaufin examined the applicant on August 15, 1990. He 
opined that the applicant had acute chronic cervical radiculopathy 
secondary to spondylosis and protrusion of the disc at C6-7 
bilaterally. He recommended surgery to decompress the nerve roots, 
but the applicant did not want surgery at that time. Dr. Gaufin 
recommended that the applicant avoid jolting or jarring the neck, 
use of a soft cervical collar, cervical traction taught by a 
physical therapist, and anti-inflammatory and muscle relaxants. In 
January 1991, Dr. Gaufin gave the applicant a 33% whole person 
impairment rating due to her industrial injuries. 
On April 29, 1991 Dr. Harris examined the applicant upon the 
insurance carrier's request. He gave the applicant a 34% 
impairment rating, but apportioned the majority of the rating to 
1986 nonindustrial injury and subsequent surgeries. 
The applicant saw Dr. Potter for depression and headaches in 
June and July 1991. On October 25, 1991 the applicant's request 
for Social Security disability benefits was denied. The Social 
Security Administration determined in an order dated October 25, 
1991, that the applicant could work an 8-hour day with normal 
breaks. The applicant saw Dr. Potter on November 7, 1991, and he 
noted that the applicant was having problems closing her hands. 
Dr. Watkins, a neurologist, saw the applicant on December 20, 1991. 
He ordered a nerve conduction velocity test, EMG's of both arms and 
a MRI of the brain, all of which were within normal limits. On 
March 5, 1992, Dr. Watkins reported that the applicant had 
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developed dizziness, had gone off all medications, and was taking 
meclizine for the dizziness. 
A March 31, 1992 functional capacity evaluation at Carbon 
Emery Physical Therapy classified the applicant for light/sedentary 
work. The report noted that the applicant was not in control of 
her pain and was limited by her fear of reinjury. Dr. Matthews 
diagnosed the applicant with fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory 
polyarthritis on April 6, 1992. He also tested her for multiple 
sclerosis, lyme disease and hypothyroidism. He returned a 
diagnosis of hypothyroidism and chronic pain on June 1, 1992. Dr. 
Potter, on May 19, 1992, noted hand pain, leg swelling and 
diagnosed possible fibromyacitis and fatigue. 
A Career Guidance Center report dated June 15, 1992 concluded 
that there were jobs available for which the applicant was trained, 
but that it might be difficult for the applicant to find an 
employer willing to accommodate her disabilities. The applicant is 
a high school graduate with a 20 year work history in retail sales, 
accounting and clerical positions. She believes that she can no 
longer perform these types of work due to her inability to sit and 
work for long periods at a desk or to bend, lift, reach and stand 
as required in retail sales. 
The ALJ referred this matter to a medical panel for an 
apportionment of the applicant's impairment among several possible 
causes. The medical panel attributed 1.27 % of the applicant's 
permanent impairment to her December 1987 accident, 2.83% of the 
applicant's permanent impairment to her August 15, 1988 accident, 
and 33.17% to various pre-existing causes. No permanent impairment 
was attributed to the July 9, 1990 incident. The medical panel 
further concluded that the applicant's depression and pre-existing 
personality disorder were caused by non-industrial factors. 
The applicant received Social Security disability benefits 
pursuant to a decision dated December 21, 1992. The decision 
stated that the following impairments were relevant to the award of 
disability benefits: 
[A] history of lumbar disc surgery in January 
1987, and cervical disc surgery in March 1987; 
post traumatic right, greater than left, hand 
numbness with decreased grip and intermittent 
hand pain; fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory 
polyarthritis; polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; 
degenerative joint disease; degenerative disc 
disease; depression; and passive dependent 
personality disorder. 
The Social Security Administration decision lists 10 separate 
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medical problems which contribute to the applicant's disability 
status. Four of those medical problems are clearly unrelated to 
the applicant's industrial injuries (the 1987 surgeries, 
hypothyroidism, depression and passive dependant personality 
disorder). The industrial injuries may have contributed to the 
other six conditions, but the medical evidence does not show a 
causal connection between the applicant's hand problems, 
fibromyalgia, polyarthritis, polypharmacy, degenerative joint 
disease, and degenerative disc disease and the applicant's 
industrial accident of August 15, 1988. The medical panel assigned 
95% of the applicant's 14% lower back impairment and 80% of the 
applicant's 17% cervical spine impairment to the applicant's 
balloon chasing accident and other pre-existing impairments. The 
relatively small proportion of the applicant's impairment that was 
attributed to the industrial accident of August 15, 1988, is, in 
our view, insufficient to support a finding that the applicant's 
permanent total disability was caused by that industrial accident. 
Therefore, the applicant has not proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence that her disability was caused by her industrial 
accident of August 15, 1988. Therefore, under Hodges and Large, 
she is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The 
applicant's claim for permanent total disability benefits under the 
odd-lot doctrine likewise fails due to the lack of a causal 
connection between the industrial accident and her permanent total 
disability. We therefore, find that the ALJ's finding that the 
applicant is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge 
dated February 4, 1993 is hereby affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days from the date of this order, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, 
and 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dept. of Employment Security, 201 
Ut. Adv. Rep. 79 (CA 12/04/92). The requesting party shall bear 
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all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. 
\ f\ 
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92000255, on J-fL+xiav of /ZjA^Ji^f , 19_£3. to the following: 
CLAUDIA COX 
P O BOX 273 
ORANGEVILLE, UTAH 84537 
RINEHART PESHELL, ATTORNEY 
73 21 SOUTH STATE 
MIDVALE UT 84047 
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
P O BOX 27008 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84127-0008 
ERIE V. BOORMAN, ATTORNEY 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND 
EDWARD B. HAVAS 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
2020 BENEFICIAL LIFE BUILDING 
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Adell Butldr-Mitchell 
Paralegal 
General Counsel's Office 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Appendix D: 
Letter Dated March 9, 1993 from A U 
to Petitioner's Counsel 
vr 
Michael O Leavitt 
Governor 
State of Utah 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
Stephen M Hadley 
Chairman 
Thomas R Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner March 9 , 1 9 9 3 
Timothy C. Allen 
Presiding Administrative Low Judge 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
(801) 530-6800 
(801) 530-6804 (Fax) 
EDWARD HAVAS 
ATTORNEY 
2020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Re: Claudia Cox 
Inj: 8-15-88 
Emp: Utah Power & Light 
Dear Mr, Havas: 
I have received your Motion for Review for the above-
referenced matter and I will not be altering my order based on the 
issues you raise in that Motion. There is no question that the 
industrial injury caused impairment, but the issue in this case is 
whether it caused her to become permanently totally disabled and 
there were many other non-industrial factors involved in her final 
decision to cease working. You indicate a number of times in your 
Motion that some of the Social Security diagnoses were PROBABLY 
caused by the industrial injury. I found only that there was a 
POSSIBILITY of this, but no medical evidence to suggest any more 
than this. Finally, I do not believe that the 1988 accident was 
the straw that broke the camel's back. The applicant worked for 
two years after the 1988 accident and had many non-industrial 
medical problems during this time. 
BY A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO MR. PESHELL AND MR. BOORMAN, I AM 
NOTIFYING THEM THAT THEY HAVE 15 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS LETTER 
TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION FOR REVIEW. AT THE EXPIRATION OF THAT 
TIME PERIOD, I WILL FORWARD THE MATTER ON TO THE COMMISSION FOR A 
FINAL RULING. 
cc: 
£. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Claudia Cox, P O Box 273, Orangeville, UT 84537 
Rinehart Peshell, Attorney, 7321 South State, Midvale, UT 
84047 
Energy Mutual Insurance, P O Box 27008, SLC, UT 84127-0008 
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator, Employers Reinsurance 
Fund 
ooosi* 
Appendix E: 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Applicant's Motion for Review 
Rinehart L. Peshell, 2573 
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL 
7321 South State Street 
Midvale, UT 84047 
(801) 255-3591 
Attorney for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
CLAUDIA COX, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/ 
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
TO APPLICANTS MOTION FOR 
REVIEW 
CASE NO. 92000255 
Defendants Utah Power and Light and Energy Mutual Insurance 
Company, by and through their attorney Rinehart L. Peshell, hereby 
submit their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Applicant's Motion For Review. 
FACTS 
The following undisputed facts are essential in order to 
properly consider whether Applicant's Motion For Review should be 
granted. 
1. Commencing in 1978 through August and September 1986, 
applicant was treated by a chiropractor for back pain. See Exhibit 
oc 
"A" attached hereto, p. 1-2. 
2. During that same period of time, Applicanc was also 
treated for fatigue, anemia, depression, allergic rhinitis, 
phlebitis, heart palpitation with chest pain and underwent a 
complete hysterectomy. See Exhibit "A" p. 1-3 
3. On October 4, 1986, Applicant was involved in a non-
industrial accident which injured her back and eventually resulted 
in surgery on January 5, 1987, when a semi-hemi laminotomy, 
foraminotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 was performed. 
On March 9, 1987, Applicant underwent, as the result of the October 
4, 1986 accident, an anterior cervical diskectomy with nerve root 
decompression and interbody fusion C4-5 and C5-6. See Exhibit "A," 
p. 4-6. 
4. In December, 1987, applicant suffered her first 
industrial injury; but saw no doctors and missed no work time as 
a result of said accident. See Exhibit "A," p. 6-7. 
5. On August 15, 1988, Applicant bent down to pull out a 
bottom drawer of a file cabinet. The file drawer which was filled 
with papers and books, stopped abruptly as it was being opened and 
something gave in the middle of applicant's back. See Exhibit !iA,fl 
p. 7. 
6. Thereafter, Applicant, although her condition seemed to 
worsen, continued to work and even worked overtime from January 
1990 through April 1990. See Exhibit "A," p. 9. 
7. On July 9, 1990, applicant turned her head while at work 
and suffered a resultant neck spasm and symptoms on down her spine. 
See Exhibit "A," p.10. 
8. Said incident was found to be non-compensable. See 
Exhibit "A," p. 18. 
9. After July 9, 1990, Applicant suffered a tingling 
sensation in both hands and in the right arm along with 
intermittent loss of grip, tingling in front of her left ear and 
numbness in the first 3 digits of the hand- See Exhibit "A,11, p. 
13. 
10. On April 6, 1992, Applicant was diagnosed with 
fibromyalgia, fatigue, hypothyroidism and chronic pain. See 
Exhibit "A," p. 14. 
11. Applicant was reduced to even less activity, as a result 
of the July 9, 1990 accident, than she performed after the August 
15, 1988 accident. See Exhibit "A," p. 14. 
12. Applicant was off work for seven to eight months as a 
result of the 1986 New Mexico accident and underwent two surgeries. 
No immediate medical care or lost work time resulted from either 
the 1987 or 1988 industrially-related accidents. See Exhibit "A," 
p. 19. 
13. In 1988, 1989, and 1990, Applicant suffered from fatigue, 
3 00104 
bloating, sinus headaches, ear problems, hot flashes, drug 
dependency, high cholesterol, fibromyalgia, hypothyroidism, 
depression and anxiety. See Exhibit "A," p. 19-20. 
ARGUMENT 
Applicant argues that she is entitled to permanent total 
disability award and compensation under the Workers Compensation 
Act if applicant's industrial injuries contributed to Applicant's 
whole person impairment rating and Applicant can show a "medically 
demonstrable causal link between her industrial accident and her 
permanent disability.". 
In Large vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, the Supreme Court 
held: 
... a claimant for permanent total disability 
benefits must prove medically that his 
disability was caused by an industrial 
accident. Large vs. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 758 P2d 954, 957 (1988). 
Cause means "to make happen." Websterf s Encyclopedic 
Dictionary, 1990. 
In the Large matter, Mr. Large had prior back problems and 
herniated lumbar disc surgery when he slipped and fell from a truck 
at work. Mr. Largefs doctor stated that Mr. Large had difficulty 
in walking due to his weight and back problems. X-rays showed that 
Mr. Large had an old compression fracture. The Utah Supreme Court 
4 
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in denying Mr. Largefs claim held: 
We find substantial evidence in the record to support a 
finding that the 1985 injury was not the medical cause 
of Large's permanent total disability status and that 
Largefs age, obesity, lack of transferable skills and 
prior back surgery resulted in his disability. Large, 
Infra p. 957. 
In other words, the slipping from the truck at work did not 
make Mr. Large disabled. 
In the matter presented before the Commission, there is no 
medical evidence, nor is there a medical opinion, that the August 
15, 1988 incident caused Applicant's disability. The most that can 
be found are medical opinions that said accident contributed to 
Applicant's overall disability. Applicant continued to work after 
the August 15, 1988 accident and even worked overtime until April 
1990. After the non-compensable incident of July 9, 1990, 
Applicant's condition was worse and she suffered greater 
limitations an£ could do less activity than after the August 15, 
1988 incident. X-rays taken after the 1988 accident showed no 
appreciable change from those taken after the 1986 non-industrial 
accident. 
In addition, Applicant, in 1990, was suffering from fatigue, 
bloating, sinus headaches, ear problems, hot flashes, drug 
dependency, high cholesterol, fibromyalgia, polyarthritis and 
hypothyroidism, depression and anxiety. 
There are no medical opinions stating that any of the medical 
5 
problems above listed were significantly related to applicant's 
industrial injury, nor was there a medical opinion as to what 
actually caused applicant to become totally disabled. 
In addition, Applicant has only a high school education and 
has worked only as a sales clerk and in accounting and clerical 
positions. Applicant testified that she was unable to perform 
these types of jobs any longer. 
Applying the language of the Large case to this case, it can 
be said that there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
a finding that the August 15, 1988 injury was not the medical cause 
of Cox's permanent total disability status and that Cox's lack of 
transferable skills, prior back surgeries, and other medical 
problems not related to her industrial injury resulted in her 
disability. 
Applicant has the burden of proof to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the medical cause of her 
disability was the August 15, 1988 accident. No such showing was 
made. In fact, the ALJ found that the August 15, 1988 accident was 
not the cause; but only a minor contributory factor leading to 
applicant's claimed permanent total disability. 
6 * ^  *i? {s **y 
CONCLUSION 
Because of Applicant's numerous other medical non-industrial 
related problems from which Applicant was suffering in July 1990, 
and because there is no medical evidence that the August 15, 1988 
industrial injury caused Applicant to become permanently totally 
disabled, applicant's Motion For Review should be denied. 
, 1993. 
u a w r f K e\ 
DATED this °1 ^  day of jfA t*-JL 
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL 
RINEHART L. PESHELL 
Attorney for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing this 9rJ^ day of TfY) ^-<^f , 1993, to: 
EDWARD B. HAVAS 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT 
2020 BENEFICIAL LIFE BUILDING 
3 6 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
ERIE V. BOORMAN 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, #3 00 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
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Appendix F: 
Social Security Decision 
(801)748-2127 
NOTE TO PROCESSING CENTER 
FURTHER ACTION NECESSARY 
DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
Social Security Administration 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
Refer to : 528-74-9096 
Claudia A. Cox 
P.O. Box 273 
Orangeville, UT 84537 
NOTICE OF FAVORABLE DECISION - PLEASE READ CAREFULLY 
This Decision Is Favorable To You 
• Another office will process the decision. You will receive a 
notice from that office. 
• Your local Social Security office or another office may ask 
you to give more information before you receive the notice. If 
so, please answer promptly. 
• If you hear nothing about this decision for 60 days, please 
contact your local Social Security office. 
If You Think the Decision is Wrong 
• You have the right to appeal. You must file your appeal 
within 60 days from the date you receive this notice. (It will 
be presumed that you received the notice within 5 days after the 
date shown below, unless you show us that you did not receive it 
within the 5-day period.) 
• When you appeal, you request the Appeals Council to review the 
decision. If the Appeals Council grants your request, itTwill 
review the entire record in your case. It will review those 
parts of the decision which you think are wrong. It will also 
review those parts which you think are correct and may make them 
unfavorable or less favorable to you. You will receive a new 
decision. 
• You (or your representative) have to ask for the appeal in 
writing. You may sign a form HA-520, called "Request for Review 
by the Appeals Council," or write a letter, 
• You may submit your appeal to your local Social Security 
office, a hearing office, or mail it directly to the Appeals 
Council, Office of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 3200, 
Arlington, VA 22203. 
f\r. ^*?JI 
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The Appeals Council May Review the Decision on it? Own Motion 
• Within 60 days from the date shown below, the Appeals Council 
may review the decision on its own motion. This could change the 
decision. 
• After the 60-day period, the Appeals Council may reopen and 
revise the decision in certain situations. 
• The Appeals Council will notify you if it decides to review 
the decision on its own motion or to reopen and revise the 
decision. 
Unless you request review or the Appeals Council reviews the 
decision on its own motion, you may not obtain a court review of 
your case (sections 205(g), 1631(c)(3) or 1869(b) of the Social 
Security Act). 
This notice and the enclosed copy of 
decision mailed 
December 21, 1992 
cc: 
Name and Address of Representative 
Chon Kandaris 
Utah Legal Services 
2 3 S. Carbon Ave., Suite 4 
Price, UT 84501 
(801)637-3049 
Replaces Form HA-L502-U7 
0005? 
NOTE TO PROCESSING CENTFR 
FURTHER ACTION NECE^SAR^ 
DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
Social Security Administration 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
DECISION 
IN THE CASE OF CLAIM FOR 
Period of Disability and 
Claudia A. Cox Disability Insurance Benefits 
(Claimant) 
528-74-9096 
(Wage Earner) (Social Security Number) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case is before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a 
request for hearing filed by the claimant, who is dissatisfied 
with the previous determinations finding that she is not 
disabled. 
The claimant appeared and testified at the hearing, represented 
by Chon Kandaris, a non-attorney representative. At the request 
of the ALJ, G. Barrie Nielson appeared and testified as a 
vocational expert. 
ISSUES 
The issues in this case are whether the claimant is under a 
disability as defined by the Social Security Act and if so, when 
her disability commenced, the duration of the disability, and 
whether the insured status requirements of the Act are met for 
the purpose of entitlement to a period of disability and 
disability insurance benefits. 
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
After a thorough evaluation of the entire record, it is concluded 
that the claimant has been disabled since July 9, 1990, and met 
the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on 
that date and thereafter, through December 31, 1995. 
OO053 
Claudia A. Cox 
528-74-9096 
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The claimant was 50 years old on the date her disability began. 
The claimant has a 12th grade education. The claimant has not 
engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the disability 
onset date. 
The claimant has the following impairments which are considered 
to be "severe11 under the Social Security Act and Regulations: a 
history of lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, and cervical disc 
surgery in March 1987; post traumatic right, greater than left, 
hand numbness with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain; 
fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory polyarthritis; polypharmacy; 
hypothyroidism; degenerative joint disease; degenerative disc 
disease; depression; and passive dependant personality disorder. 
These impairments prevent the claimant from sustaining work 
activities. The claimant's condition fluctuates. She has some 
good days but the bad days out number the good days. Overall, 
she has a residual functional capacity for less than a full range 
of sedentary work. 
The claimant's description of her limitations is consistent with 
the record when considered in its entirety. The claimant cannot 
perform her past relevant work and does not have transferable 
skills to perform other work within her residual functional 
capacity. 
Given the claimant's residual functional capacity, and the 
vocational factors of her age, education and past relevant work 
experience, there are no jobs existing in significant numbers 
that the claimant is capable of performing. The claimant is 
under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act and 
Regulations. 
FINDINGS 
After consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law 
Judge makes the following findings: 
1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Act 
on July 9, 1990. The claimant has not performed any 
substantial gainful activity since July 9, 1990. 
2. The claimant's impairments which are considered to be 
"severe" under the.,Social Security Act are a history of 
lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, and cervical disc 
surgery in March 1987; post traumatic right, greater than 
left, hand numbness with decreased grip and intermittent 
hand pain; fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory 
polyarthritis; polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; degenerative 
joint disease; degenerative disc disease; depression; and 
passive dependant personality disorder. 
Claudia A. Cox 
528-74-9096 
3. The claimant's impairments do not meet or equal in severity 
the appropriate medical findings contained io 2 0 CFR Part 
404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P (Listing of Impairments). 
4. The claimant's allegations are found to be credible. 
5. The claimant's impairments prevent her from sustaining work 
activities. The claimant's condition fluctuates. She has 
some good days but the bad days out number the good days. 
6. The claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work. 
7. The claimant was 50 years old on the date disability began, 
which is defined as closely approaching advanced age. The 
claimant has a high school education. 
8. The claimant does not have transferable skills to perform 
other work within her physical and mental residual 
functional capacity. 
9. Based upon the claimant's residual functional capacity, and 
vocational factors, there are no jobs existing in 
significant numbers which she can perform. This finding is 
based upon the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule 201.14, 
2 0 CFR Part 4 04, Appendix 2 to Subpart P, and the testimony 
of the Vocational Expert. 
10. The claimant has been under a disability as defined by the 
Social Security Act and Regulations since July 9, 1990. 
DECISION 
Based on the Title II application filed on April 9, 1991, the 
claimant is entitled to a period of disability beginning on July 
9, 1990, and to disability insurance benefits under sections 
216(i) and 223, respectively, of the Social Security Act,-and the 
claimant's disability has continued through at least the date of 
this decision. 
lrie 
Administrative Law Judge 
December 21, 1992 
Date 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Claudia A. Cox 
CLAIMANT 
528-74-9096 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
WAGE EARNER (If other than Clmt) SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
Exhibit 
No. Description 
No. of 
Pages 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Application for Disability Insurance Benefits, 
filed 4-9-91 3 
Notice of Initial Denial of Disability 
Insurance Benefits, dated 10-25-91 2 
Request for Reconsideration, filed 12-17-91 2 
Notice of Reconsideration Denial of Disability 
Insurance Benefits, dated 5-15-92 3 
Request for Hearing, filed 7-7-92 2 
Earnings Record, dated 7-22-91 2 
Disability Report(s), dated 1-28-91 8 
Reconsideration Disability Report, dated 11-20-91 6 
Vocational Report(s), dated 1-28-91 6 
Report of Contact, re: Company Disability Plan, 
dated 6-4-91 1 
Report of Contact, dated 10-2-91 i 
Claimant's Statement When Request for Hearing 
is Filed and the Issue Is Disability, 
dated 6-29-92 2 
Disability Determination(s) by State Agency, 
Title II, Initial dated 10-9-91; 
Reconsideration dated 4-28-92 with attachments 14 
Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, dated 1-5-87 to 1-13-87 10 
Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, dated 3-9-87 to 3-15-87 9 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
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WAGE EARNER (If other than Clint) SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
Exhibit 
NO. Description 
No. of 
Pages 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Medical Records from Emery Medical Center, P.C. 
dated 5-31-88 to 12-7-90 14 
Medical Report from David Herner, M.D., 
dated 8-30-91 3 
Treatment notes covering the period from 
10-3-88 to 11-25-91 by Lynn Gaufin, M.D. 23 
Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, dated 11-25-91 to 2-4-92 6 
Medical Records from Sterling Potter, M.D., 
dated 9-6-91 to 2-26-92 5 
Medical Records from Joseph R. Watkins, M.D., 
dated 12-20-91 to 3-5-92 17 
Medical Report from Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, 
dated 3-30-92 1 
Resume of G. Barrie Nielson, Vocational Expert 2 
Medical Records from Jeffrey L. Mathews, M.D., 
dated 4/7/92 to 8/12/92. 13 
Medical Report from Lynn Ravesten, Ph.D., dated 
11/12/92. 5 
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Appendix G: 
Accident Report of August 15, 1988 
and Co-Employee Statements 
UP&LCo. Form 6274W49 9B7 ^ . . . n i a lnbu i ion -
Original. Iiisurtinrr Service 
NON-MEDICAL INJURY FORM UTAH Y"~ u - r t m n M ^ 
Gold Safet) Orpt 
/ , Koom 133 G () 
To: INSURANCE SERVICES 
Date vy--£*4<<3^^ 
n , (f . 
Utah Power & Light Company < / / / / •'/ 
Name of Injured L^lU^UciJ-.a- *J...-...( LA-
\ )\4 Pleaae Print 
I was injured at..«»!.*. JuQ.. .QM^today 
r^ZL^..../^.1^2xl<C^ Avenui Location of accident ...."^tt.J^d-iXJL<^..../...iJ?L^^ A~4~*r... Avenue 
Work being performed 
Part of body injured. 
Was first aid given? ^ e 8 H, By whom 
There is no indication that I will need to lose time on account of the injury but I will let you know immediately 
if it becomes more serious or if there is any indication of infection or other complications. . 
Division „ Signed by Injured .J^^J^^ 
*^.<zzu~~±r&r*. s i 8 n ^ „ r :.,..., 
Questions, contact This form is to be conif "ed and turned in to Supervisor the day of injur^. 
Ext. 7507 G.O. 
T ? : M n # XJ »•**«->••+ n f f n i n t « v m n a t Kr» o n m n l o f o r l i f f r p n t p H h v fl t\i\tr*tc%f 
February 13, 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
This memo is in reference to Claudia Cox's on-the-job injury 
of August 15, 1988. As her supervisor, on August 16, 1988, I 
investigated the cause of the above-stated injury as reported on 
the non-medical injury form. 
Claudia had stated that she had strained her shoulder, neck, 
and back while opening a file cabinet at Karma 0' Bryan' s desk (a 
co-worker in the same office). I opened the same file cabinet 
and found it to be very heavy and sticking as I was trying to 
open it. I, then, used some silicone spray to lubricate the 
guides to allow the drawer to more easily open to eliminate any 
re-occurance of strain from opening this file cabinet drawer. 
I am aware of another on-the-job injury dated 12/18/87 where 
a chair had slipped out from under Claudia causing her to fall 
while attempting to sit down. She informed me that this had 
caused her severe pain in her lower back and that she would take 
the muscle-relaxers and medication previously prescribed by her 
doctor to try to keep from having a lost-time accident. 
Claudia has worked for me since 1980 and had a very good 
safety record up until the time of these accidents. I have found 
that she observes safety regulations and is conscious of our 
safety program and goals. 
jS-tgned,
 < 
James A. Williams 
Hunter Planning Supervisor 
S t a t e of Utah 
County of Emery 
^ 00017 
Notary P u b l i c 
Mv C n m r n i Q C i n n Vvni*~^<- H Q / n ^ / Q Q 
w 
February 13, 1989 
To Whom It May Concern, 
RE: Industrial Claim - Claudia Cox 
August 15, 1988 
At the request of Lee Hofeling, Investigator for Energy Mutual Insurance, 
I wish to affirm the fact that the file drawer in question was indeed 
heavily weighted with paper for work, and would also occasionally stick 
when pulling it out. On numerous occasions I would require the use of both 
hands to open the drawer. This problem was only known to me since I am 
usually the only one getting into this drawer. On the day that the accident 
occurred, I was absent from work and Claudia was doing my work plus her own, 
she needed to get into this drawer for supplies, and didn't know of the problem 
that I was having with this drawer. 
6L\si^><~&-
Karma 0*Bryan 
State of Utah 
County of Emery 
n + zr\r D M W T T . 
{//^^cLj Or /C^CJUJ^^ 
